Campesino community participation in watershed management by Galewski, Nancy
 




























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Master’s Degree 
City and Regional Planning and Public Policy in the 












COPYRIGHT 2010 BY NANCY GALEWSKI
 


























Dr. Michael Elliott, Advisor 
School of City and Regional Planning 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Barbara Lynch 
School of International Affairs 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Jennifer Clark 
School of Public Policy 


































 I wish to thank my committee members Dr. Michael Elliott, Dr. Barbara Lynch, 
and Dr. Jennifer Clark for their generous support and guidance for my research. I also 
wish to thank Asociación Urpichallay and The Mountain Institute for their support and 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES vi 
LIST OF FIGURES vii 
SUMMARY viii 
CHAPTER 
1 CHAPTER1 INTRODUCTION 1 
2 CHAPTER 2 THE CALLEJÓN DE HUAYLAS, PERU 4 
2.1 Social and Economic Conditions 4 
2.2 The Callejón de Huaylas and Huascaran 6 
2.3 Campesino Communities in the Callejón de Huaylas 9 
2.4 Threats to Water Supply 11 
2.5 Increasing Water Demand 16 
3 CHAPTER 3 FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED GOVERNANCE 29 
3.1 Common Property Resource Management 32 
3.2 Local Water Management Systems in the Peruvian Highlands 42 
3.3 Integrated Water Resource Management 52 
4 CHAPTER 4METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 66 
4.1 Research Design 66 
4.2 Characteristics of Interviews 70 
4.3 Results 76 
5 CHAPTER5 WATER REGIMES AND CAMPESINO COMMUNITIES 103 
5.1 The Old and New Water Laws in Peru 104 
5.2 Institutional Reform 110 
5.3 Extractive Industries Policy in Peru 113 
v 
 
5.4 Campesino Communities and the Peruvian Water Regime 115 
6 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 120 
6.1 Opportunities and Challenges 123 
6.2 Future Outlook 128 
APPENDIX A: SEVEN ECOSYSTEM ZONES 130 
APPENDIX B: CHAVIMOCHIC IRRIGATION PROJECT 131 
APPENDIX C: ANCASH MINING METAL PRODUCTION 2008 132 




LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 2.1: Districts along the Río Santa 6 
Table 2.2: Change in Glacier Cover Scenarios 15 
Table 2.3: Water use along the Río Santa 17 
Table 2.4: Population change in Ancash and select provinces 23 
Table 2.5: Basic Service Provision in Select areas in Ancash 24 
Table 4.1: Characteristics of Interviewees 71 
Table 4.2: Study Areas in the District of Marcará 74 
Table 4.3: District of Marcará Population Change 1993-2007 75 
Table 4.4: District of Olleros Population Change 1993-2007 76 
Table 4.5: Problems with Water 77 
Table 4.6: How Individuals Participate in Water Management 85 
Table 4.7: Suggestions to Improve Water Management at the Local and Regional Level 90 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 2.1: The Callejón de Huaylas 7 
Figure 2.2: Glaciers in the Cordillera Blanca 15 
Figure 3.1: Community Hierarchies in Water Management 46 
Figure 4.1: Department of Ancash Map 73 













A series of threats face campesino communities’ water management practices in the 
Callejón de Huaylas (upper region of the Santa Watershed). Competition for water resources is 
escalating due to increasing demand, decreasing supply, and a rise in contamination levels, 
leaving campesino communities in a precarious state as a result of their marginalized position in 
Peruvian society. Competition for water resources occurs between upstream and downstream 
users and amongst sectors including mining, agriculture, hydropower, and domestic water users. 
The national government recently passed an integrated water resource management system to 
improve water governance. However, bureaucratic tendencies make it unlikely that campesinos 
will receive an adequate share of resources. 
 Campesino communities in the Callejón need to adopt new strategies to improve their 
position vis á-vis other sectors and resist capture of resources. Campesinos are important to the 
discussion of water resource management because they have long established systems of self-
regulated management and need to be included in the new system of watershed governance. This 
research first examines local water management strategies and integrated water management 
through four characteristics: 1) how is water framed, 2) is decision-making participatory, 3) is 
water management appropriate to the local and regional level, and 4) is it possible to monitor 
activity and impose consequences for unauthorized water usage. Interviews with campesino 
community members and leaders, local officials, regional representatives, and non-governmental 
organizations found opportunities to collaborate between groups and transfer some management 
responsibilities to a more regional watershed scale. Second, this research examines the 
opportunities and barriers to scaling up traditional management practices to meet regional needs 
while ensuring local water availability. Scaling decision-making is imperative for successful 
integrated water management and will allow campesino communities to continue to manage their 
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water to meet local needs. Shifting the decision-making scale may facilitate more effective 






Conflicts over water have become commonplace across the world as different 
users compete for diminishing freshwater resources. Water scarcity is a product of the 
natural and political environment that increases competition and creates tensions among 
water users. While governments seek to allocate scarce water resources, these allocations 
often depend on adequate representation in the decision-making processes.  
At the heart of the water problems in the Callejón de Huaylas, a valley region in 
Peru, increasing demand for freshwater is coupled with a changing and eventual 
decreasing, supply. Glacial recession and increased variability in precipitation have 
altered water flow in the Río Santa (Santa River) watershed. The increased variability in 
water supply negatively affects both upstream and downstream users and accentuates 
tensions between them. In particular, peasant (campesino) communities (primarily 
located in the highlands) must compete for water resources against external actors. Water 
governance in Peru does not take into account the needs of these communities. The 
national government increasingly disenfranchises campesino communities by meeting 
needs of external actors such as extractive industries, foreign enterprises, and coastal 
populations at the expense of highland communities. This research then, seeks to 
understand how campesino communities can become part of the watershed decision-
making process in a manner that allows them to meet their needs. 
Elinor Ostrom (1990) found examples of successful common pool resource 
management and identified a series of characteristics that were present in each successful 
system. Using Ostrom’s framework for successful common pool resource management, I 
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examine both local water management in campesino communities and integrated water 
management systems. I use four key characteristics from the framework to find 1) how 
water is valued 2) whether the decision-making process is participatory 3) whether 
management is appropriate to the local and regional context, and 4) the extent to which 
water usage can be monitored and consequences for unauthorized use imposed.  
The national government’s 2009 water law promotes integrated management and 
establishes a regional watershed management council. That said, the law provides no 
mechanisms for campesino community participation. Although the national government 
has not privatized water, this may happen in the future. The overall goal of this research 
is to assess the potential of local water management to continue to serve the needs of 
local communities within the new watershed governance structure.  
My research focuses on the position of the rural campesino communities who will 
very likely be placed in a precarious situation regarding their access to freshwater 
resources as they compete against powerful international companies and a national 
government that disenfranchises highland populations. Impoverishment, illiteracy, low 
gross domestic product and human development index, and poor access to improved 
sanitation are just some of the obstacles these communities face. In addition, threats to 
water availability will limit access of these communities to adequately meet their needs. 
Since the time of the Spanish conquest, indigenous and campesino (peasant) communities 
have been subject to disenfranchisement and marginalization. Today, the national 
government continues these trends through policy decisions and management that lacks 
representation from campesino communities. 
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The overall nature of this problem includes upstream-downstream competition, 
coupled with intersectoral conflicts, and competing voices with varying levels of 
representation. In this light, a system of watershed governance acceptable to both local 
conditions and regional (or national) decision-making bodies is crucial to ensure these 
communities continued access to water resources. 
My research took place from May to August 2009, in the Callejón de Huaylas. I 
selected two districts for analysis where I interviewed community members, community 
leaders, government officials, and non-governmental organizations. Through qualitative 
interviews and community meetings, I was able to learn about the water situation in these 
districts from the viewpoint of the communities and the state officials.  
Chapter two describes social and economic conditions in communities in the 
Callejón, including current and future supply and demand side threats to water supply. 
Chapter three reviews characteristics of local water management in highland 
communities and the principles of integrated water resource management. Based on 
Elinor Ostrom’s work on successful common-property resource management systems, I 
find four characteristics particularly important to the discussion of campesino 
communities in the Callejón. Chapter four will summarize the nature of each study area 
and provide detail about the findings. Chapter five reviews campesino communities in 
water regimes and will then discuss the nature of the 1969 General Water Law (Ley 
General de Aguas) and 2009 Water Resources Law (Ley de Recursos Hídricos). Chapter 
six examines the barriers and opportunities for campesino communities to gain a stronger 
voice in the decision-making process at the regional level and further discussion about 




 THE CALLEJÓN DE HUAYLAS, PERU 
This chapter reviews social and economic conditions of the area followed by a 
description of campesino communities in the Callejón. It also provides a comprehensive 
overview of the series of problems that affect the Río Santa watershed.   
Peru’s Callejón de Huaylas is a valley region in the Santa watershed. The Callejón 
de Huaylas runs 150 km north to south between the Cordillera Blanca and Cordillera 
Negra, stopping at the Cañon del Pato (Duck’s Canon). The Callejón begins near Lake 
Conococha and ends just past the city of Caraz.  
The Santa watershed is the major water resource for the Department of Ancash. 
The river runs between the two mountain ranges, Cordillera Blanca and Cordillera Negra, 
in the Peruvian Andes. The upper limits of Río Santa and its watershed cover an area of 
4,900 km2, known as the Callejón de Huaylas. The Río Santa originates in Lake 
Conococha, at an altitude of 4050 meters above sea level. At the hydroelectric plant in 
Huallanca, it enters the lowlands and the coastal region, flowing through the narrow 
gorge of Cañon del Pato, and into the Pacific Ocean. In total, the river travels a distance 
of more than 300 km and drains a watershed of 12,200 km2 (Figure 2.1). The Río Santa 
not only maintains life in the Callejón, it is one of few rivers that flows year-round into 
the Pacific Ocean. According to Mark et al. (2004), “[the Santa] is the least variable of 
Pacific draining rivers in the nation”.  
2.1 Social and Economic Conditions 
This section examines social and economic indicators for Peru and the 
Department of Ancash. In 2003, Peru ranked 26th of the 33 Latin American countries for 
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and ranked 22 out of 33 on the Human Development 
Index (HDI) (Martinelli et al. 2006). In 2009, Peru had a GDP of $253 billion and $8,600 
per capita and ranked 45th and 115th in the world, respectively (CIA 2010). There is high 
inequality among Peruvian Regions, including Ancash. In 2004, Ancash had a higher 
percentage of people in poverty (55.3%) and extreme poverty (23.4%) than the national 
average (51.6% and 19.2%, respectively) (World Bank 2005). In 2006, UNICEF found 
that in Ancash approximately 29 percent of adolescents between ages 6 to 11 and 
approximately 56 percent of adolescents between ages 12 to 17 (compared to 33 and 23 
percent nationally, respectively) were enrolled in grades that did not correspond to their 
age.  
Within Ancash, there is also difference in highland and coastal areas. Illiteracy 
rates vary significantly throughout the Callejón and there is a striking difference between 
the highland areas and the coastal areas of Ancash.1  Access to indoor water supply, 
indoor bathroom and wastewater drainage, and electricity also varies between the 
highland and coastal communities in Ancash. A higher proportion of households in 
highland areas are without access to basic services (INEI 2007). 
 The poor economic conditions in the highland areas are cause for concern. When 
examining Peru by regions, Ancash typically ranks somewhere in the middle on most 
social and economic indicators. However, these rankings do not highlight the stark 
differences between coastal and highland areas. Regional indicators overall that compare 
urban to rural districts give a more precise picture of the highland communities.  
 The Callejón economy is primarily based in agriculture. In some areas, more than 
half of the working population are employed in agriculture, grazing, hunting, and forestry 
                                                          
1 The coastal regions include Santa and Chimbote 
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sectors. Table 2.1 includes a comprehensive list of important districts along the Río Santa 
(in the Callejón and on the coast). This table shows the changing economies and 
population characteristics between the highlands and coast. Differences are also present 
between large and small communities with different levels of agriculture participation.  
Table 2.1 Districts along the Río Santa 




Laguna Conococha    
Recuay 5,015 39.8 25.9 
Huaraz 56,18 10.3 9.1 
Carhuaz 13,836 47.7 49.1 
Yungay 20,075 57.9 53.4 
Caraz 23,580 43.5 36.9 
Huallanca 955 58.1 51.8 
Yuramarca 1,835 73.5 62.7 
Santa 18,010 12.5 39.1 
Source: INEI (2007) 
Clearly, agriculture is a critical sector for the districts located along the Río Santa, but the 
scale of agriculture differs significantly between the highland and coastal regions. The 
rugged highland terrain leads to smaller plots, where on the coast large land holdings are 
more common.  
2.2 The Callejón de Huaylas and Huascarán  
The Callejón has been inhabited for thousands of years, with many pre-Inca and 
Inca sites scattered throughout the valley. The area is rich in natural resources, and is 
home to Huascarán National Park (Parque Nacional Huascarán, PNH), created in 1975 
                                                          





and now a UNESCO World Heritage site.3 Huascarán Park contains seven distinct habitat 
zones: Climates in these seven ecosystems vary significantly and the changes in 
precipitation and temperature vary with changes in altitude (Appendix A). The park has a 
diverse population of flora and fauna such as the vicuña, spectacled bear, Andean condor 
and fox, whitetail deer, puma, and a wide variety of avifauna. Prominent floral species 
found in the area include Puya Raimondi, Polylepis, and Buddleia. 
 
 
Source: Vuille et. al 2008b, 15 
 
Figure 2.1 Location of the Callejón de Huaylas 
 
                                                          
3 The Park was created in 1975 through Supreme Decree 0622-75-AG. The government recognized a 
territory of 340,000 hectares. In 1985 it became a UNESCO World Heritage site 
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Highland farmers traditionally used land that was incorporated into Huascarán 
National Park in 1975. Although the park permitted only indirect uses, an exception was 
made for these highland subsistence farmers. Supreme Decree 0622-75-AG (1975) 
allowed communities with legal land rights to “continue to conduct their traditional 
agricultural and grazing activities as long as they did not destroy the natural landscape, 
clear cut trees or shrubs, burn pastures, overgraze, hunt or capture wildlife” (Parkswatch 
2004). The Natural Areas Protection Agency (Intendencia de Áreas Naturales Protegidas) 
and National Institute of Natural Resources – INRENA (Instituto Nacional de Recursos 
Naturales) created Pasture User Committees to help integrate the population into the 
National Park and meet their demands for development, while maintaining the integrity 
of the park. 4,5 
Huascarán National Park was divided into three zones by park officials: the 
nuclear, buffer and transition zone. The nuclear zone is the most isolated area containing 
campesino communities’ grazing land. The buffer zone corresponds to campesino 
communities and small individual land holdings. The creation of the park limited grazing 
and mining activities in this area. The transition zone includes two principal corridors: the 
Callejón de Huaylas and the Callejón de Conchucos (eastern side of the Cordillera 
Blanca). A majority of the population that lives in these two corridors indirectly depends 
on the natural resources in the Park (Huaraz Noticias 2009).  
The Santa watershed faces a series of threats. These threats stem from changes to 
the natural cycle, physical infrastructure challenges to control water supply, and 
increasing demand for clean water. The following section examines campesino 
                                                          
4 Both Agencies are within the Ministry of Agriculture 
5 Rights were recognized under Ministerial Resolution 1200-80-AA/DGFF 
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communities including and the nature of the community structure, community life, and 
the economy in the Callejón. Following the community discussion, a comprehensive 
analysis of the threats to water supply and water demand will provide a picture of the 
present situation in the Callejón and the potential future impacts in this area. 
2.3 Campesino Communities in the Callejón de Huaylas 
After the Spanish conquest in 1531, the colonizers first divided the land into 
encomiendas and repartamientos. Later, in the 18th century land was divided into 
haciendas great estates (haciendas). Farms in the highlands tended to be smaller due to 
the nature of the terrain. Haciendas functioned through a captive labor force comprised of 
peasants bound to the land. Perez claims in this system Indians were treated as property, 
“the Indian became a material asset in the white man's economy: a builder of roads, a 
miner or a worker on a (rubber) plantation” (Perez 2009, 1). Scholars have studied the 
Callejón since the 1950s. The Cornell-Peru project in particular, collected detailed 
information about the peasant communities in the Callejón, specifically the Community 
of Vicos. Because of its thoroughness, the Vicos community will be used as a general 
description of communities in the Callejón However, significant differences exist 
between the Vicos Community and other communities, especially since the Cornell-Peru 
project altered the hacienda-peasant relationship by replacing the role of the hacienda 
owner (patron) with the research team. Peasant haciendas changed significantly after 
Agrarian reform in 1969, communities are now independent and have the legal right to 
self-govern, but are still subject to national policies. Despite these changes, relationships 
and characteristics are still present in today’s campesino communities. In 1952, 
Anthropologist Alan Holmberg and his team accrued the hacienda Vicos. According to 
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Lynch, the community was described as a, “dispersed agglomeration of family units tied 
together by common work obligations, a local religious hierarchy and fiesta system, and 
by fictive kinship ties (compadrazgo)” (1982, 10).  
Dynamic relationships reinforced values and attitudes that helped maintain white 
(mestizo) superiority and Indian inferiority. Prominent characteristics that reinforced 
these relationships included language and attire. With little knowledge of the Spanish 
language, Indians had a difficult time communicating with townsmen who easily took 
advantage of Indians on issues such as land, labor, and even simple daily purchases in the 
market. Mestizos many times communicated with the Indians in Quechua maintaining 
language barriers between the two (Lynch 1982). Dress also prominently displayed 
cultural differences between Indians and mestizos. The bright colors, Andean skirts 
(polleras) and traditional clothing separated campesinos from mestizos (Lynch 1982).  
In addition to the language and cultural divide, there are complex vertical and 
horizontal relationships within the campesino communities and between campesinos and 
the outside world. In Vicos for example, not only did the hacienda system strengthen 
vertical ties and weaken horizontal ties; relationships between well-to-do Vicosinos and 
the hacienda or patron reinforced and deepened inequality within the community (Lynch 
1982). The hacienda was the vehicle for relations to the outside world. Constraints of 
economic and class inequality in the Callejón negatively influenced the potential for 
community development; however, the traditional bonds based on cooperation and 
reciprocity were important in the daily lives of Indians. In community social 
organization, relationships were based upon proximity and kinship ties and many times 
overlapped one another. According to Lynch,  
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“reinforcing and cross cutting family and neighborhood bonds were fictive 
kinship ties. These could be horizontal, linking individuals and families of 
approximately equal status, or vertical and instrumental  a voluntary 
patron  client relationship for the purpose of securing protection and 
possible favored status from a wealthier Vicosino or Marcará mestizo” 
(Lynch 1982, 14).  
 
Below the social group, organization was a combination of the extended and 
nuclear family dimensions. These relationships and ties were important in relationships 
where, “reciprocal obligations held kin, fictive kin and neighbors together…” (Lynch 
1982, 14) 
The hacienda system bolstered vertical relationships and forced Indians to rely 
upon the patron or hacienda for their livelihoods. Labor obligations on the hacienda were 
coupled with usufruct rights to land. In Vicos for example, peasants were allowed to 
graze their animals in the Quebrada Honda. Both haciendas and independent indigenous 
communities existed on adjacent land in the Callejón. Independent communities faced 
threats of invasion while the haciendas were more successful in preventing encroachment 
from other property owners (Lynch 1982). 
Due to vertical and horizontal relations within the community and intricate 
cultural identity, community development projects have often been subject to scrutiny by 
both rural comuneros (members of a campesino community) and urban mestizos. Indians 
in early twentieth century were fearful and hostile of the outside world. The highland 
campesinos have a strong history of reciprocal relationships and strong networks 
established within campesino communities, contributing to strong horizontal relations. 
Differing world views between townsmen and countrymen bolstered the Indians feeling 
of losing their traditions as new projects developed in their area. However, the situation is 
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slightly more complex as Indians were also able to see the benefits of certain 
technologies (Lynch 1982). 
Today, Peru is plagued by social, economic, and political divisions between the 
highlands and the coast. The largely indigenous populations in the interior face poverty, 
low literacy and education, disease, and a perception of ignorance while the modernized, 
and urbanized mestizos on the coast have better access to education, more wealth.  
Highland communities face physical infrastructure challenges in designing and 
constructing irrigation systems suitable to the highland environment. In addition, the 
threat of natural disasters makes infrastructure development a priority for these 
communities. These physical concerns increase by the growing demand for water 
resources by external actors. The following section will review the various challenges to 
both water supply and water demand.  
2.4 Threats to Water Supply 
The Santa watershed is fed by glacier melt. Changes to glacier balance impact the 
amount of water distributed to the various tributaries, streams, lakes, and the Río Santa. 
Juen et al. (2007) found glacier melt has an impact on both seasonal as well as inter-
annual variation of water runoff. This is particularly important for the Río Santa. Change 
in precipitation is the second natural feature impacting the Río Santa. Precipitation affects 
the stability of glaciers, feeds the Río Santa during the rainy season, and provides rainfall 
for highland irrigation. These changes first impact the highland communities in the 
Callejón, but also affect coastal regions that depend on the Río Santa for domestic 




2.4.1 Glacier Recession 
The Andes Mountains contain about 99 percent of all tropical glaciers in the 
world; and the Peruvian Andes account for about 70 percent of the total share (Vuille 
2008a). There is a consensus that the glaciers are receding, and the World Bank projects 
that the cities in Andean regions will face severe water stress by 2020. (World Bank No 
Date) 
Glacier balance is important to various factors such as climate stability, security 
against natural disasters, and sufficient water quality and quantity. The Cordillera Blanca, 
located in the Peruvian Andes, is an 180km long mountain range with several summits 
rising above 6000m (Figure 2.2).  
 
Source: USGS 1999 
 
Figure 2.2 Glaciers in the Cordillera Blanca  
Glacier loss in the Cordillera Blanca is significant. In 1970, glaciers covered an 
area of 723.37 km2, and by 2003, they had been reduced to 527.6 km2 (Zapata 2009; 
USGS 1999). Most studies of tropical glaciers recognize that recession has increased in 
the past 50 years relative to the first half of the century (Vuille et al. 2008a). Although 
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there appears to be a consensus that climate change is affecting the glacial water runoff, 
there is some disagreement about the magnitude of its impact6.  
Changes in moisture content, humidity, precipitation variability, and temperature 
significantly affect seasonal variability and melting rates of tropical glaciers (Juen et al., 
2007; Vuille, M., Kaiser, G., and Juen, I. 2008b). In addition, glaciers lose mass during 
warm El Niño years and gains mass during cold La Niña years. Important to note, 
Coudrain et al. (2005) found the warm El Niño periods have occurred more frequently 
since 1976.7  
A study led by the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) highlights the critical 
link between glacier melt and hydropower capacity in the La Balsa Subwatershed (Río 
Santa watershed). Researchers found the average annual volume of water would be over 
35% less without glaciers. They concluded that without glaciers, hydropower production 
downstream of the subwatershed would not surpass 75% of installed capacity (SEI et al. 
2009).  
 Glacier recession is also a serious concern for highland populations who will 
eventually lose a significant fraction of their water supply during the dry season. 
According to Jan Sevink, “In the short term, warming up causes a more massive melting 
and thus a larger discharge, but this short-term advantage will rapidly turn into the 
opposite – a long term disadvantage – when amounts stored seriously decline and 
eventually largely disappear” (Sevink 2009, 26). These concerns have prompted debates, 
conferences and symposiums that study the impacts of climate change and adaptation 
                                                          
6 In general there is some disagreement of the actual changes related to climate change, the impacts, and 
what communities, and nations should and can do about these changes. This was evident at the COP15 
United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2009. 




strategies for the future, as these impacts will affect public health, land cover, and water 
access. This may affect quality of life, migration, residence (or potential double 
residence), agriculture, or other local production. 
2.4.2 Precipitation 
As previously mentioned, changes in rainfall affect glacier mass. It also affects 
the quality of life of highland farmers, who depend on rainfall for irrigation. Precipitation 
increases at higher altitudes and falls as snow high in the Cordillera Blanca (Sevink 
2009).  
The SEI et al. (2009) Santa watershed study also created dry and wet precipitation 
scenarios. Researchers found that dry El Niño years are associated with a higher increase 
in temperature than wet La Niña years. Changes in precipitation affect the Santa 
Watershed directly and indirectly. During dry El Niño years, the decrease in precipitation 
that recharges the river and supply irrigation water is partially offset by an increase in 
glacier runoff. Table 2.2 below shows that projected changes in glacier loss are greater if 
more years are characterized with hot, dry years compared to cool, wet years. 
Table 2.2 Change in Glacier Cover Scenarios 
Total Area 







Dry 347 257 182 26 29 47 
Wet 347 300 260 14 13 25 
Source: SEI et al. 2009 
Changes in the wet and dry seasons can drastically alter agriculture production. A 
2009 report by Oxfam gathered testimonies from rural farmers who said agricultural 
production has dropped by at least half due to the precipitation and temperature changes. 
According to Oxfam, Peru’s Ministry of the Environment has also noted that in just over 
a decade the changing climate and rain patterns have negatively affected farmers who lost 
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thousands of acres of potato and white corn across the country. Farmers also said these 
changes have impacted mango, cassava, and rice (Hufstader 2009).  
Changing precipitation coupled with glacier recession affects highland and coastal 
communities throughout the year. Additional demands have been placed on the Santa 
watershed due to local, regional, and national trends in population and energy needs and 
industrial production. The following section will discuss the demand side factors 
affecting water in the local and regional context and when appropriate national context. 
2.5 Increasing Water Demand 
There are 1.8 million people living along the Río Santa who require access to 
freshwater (ICUN 2010). Competing local and regional needs raise concerns about the 
ability of campesino communities to manage highland water and their capacity to meet 
future needs. Increasing competition places campesino communities in a precarious 
position, as bureaucratic tendencies support water use with a more “productive or 
efficient” value, as determined by the state. Campesino communities are not only subject 
to the demands of other water users supported by the state, they also rely on the state for 
infrastructure development to store water and prevent natural disasters (Boelens and 
Gelles 2005). Water uses vary along the Río Santa. Highland regions use water for small-
scale irrigation and coastal areas use water for large agro-industry projects and 

















13,162 ft Headwaters 
Livestock, fishing, tourism-Huascarán  National 
Park, Pichincha “glacier” 
Recuay 3,400 m 11,050 ft 62 
Livestock, mining, agroforestry, high altitude 
agriculture (potato, oca, tarwi, barley, quinoa 
cultivation) 
Huaraz 3,090 m 10,042 ft 88 
Gold mining; urban development; tourism; high 
altitude agriculture; livestock 
Carhuaz 2,650 m 8,612 ft 126 
Corn, potato, bean cultivation, small-scale lime and 
coal mines, urban 
Yungay 2,500 m 8,125 ft 153 Corn, potato, cultivation; livestock, urban 
Caraz 2,290 m 7,442 ft 163 
Agribusiness citrus, cut flower production; gold 
mining; tourism 
Huallanca 1,820 m 5,915 ft 205 Hydroelectric plant; arid-no agriculture 
Yuramarca 1,430 m 4,647 ft 215 
Coastal irrigated agriculture, papayas, mangos, 
yucca, citrus, hot peppers, agribusiness asparagus 
and artichoke production 
Santa 0 343 Irrigated agriculture, fish meal production in Chimbote, urban use, in-shore fishing, port 
Source: Lynch 2009 
Demand-side constraints to local water management in the Callejón include 
highland demand (upstream), hydropower, coastal demand (downstream), urbanization, 
and pollution. This section will discuss each of these issues in detail.  
2.5.1 Highland Demand 
Highland demand in the Callejón is also a factor affecting water governance. 
Although farming is the primary economic activity in the highlands, rural and urban 
populations require water for domestic consumption, industry primarily uses water for 
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mining operations. Farmers use water for irrigation of highland crops such as alfalfa, and 
corn. They also require a stable water source for their animals. Domestic water use can 
include drinking, bathing, laundry, and adobe. Individual consumption is limited but 
access to water is necessary to sustain life. In urban areas along the Callejón, water is 
used for domestic consumption, construction of streets, houses, and buildings. As 
population increases in urban areas, demand for water will increase and put more 
pressure on water resources. The mining industry is a primary economic activity in Peru 
and in the Callejón de Huaylas. Mining operations use water for the residential areas 
constructed for miners and their families. Water is also used to reduce dust along the 
roads and in some methods of mineral extraction. Representatives in the mining industry 
claim to have a high percentage of water reuse and assert that the industry only uses 
0.06% of all water resources in Peru (Mesa Redonda 2009). Nevertheless, communities 
in the Callejón have had varying degrees of conflicts with mining companies over water 
contamination.  
2.5.2 Hydropower 
Ancash generates about 5.2% of Peru’s electricity in Peru (Mining and Energy 
Statistical Report 2008; MINEM 2008). In Ancash, the electrification rate has increased 
from 54.2% in 1995 to 75.5% in 2005; however, the region still ranked below the 
national average, especially below the regions with coastal populations (MINEM 2008). 
The Río Santa plays a significant role in hydropower production. The Cañon del 
Pato hydropower plant in Huallanca, is operated by Duke Energy and its subsidiary 
Egenor. The plant has a generating capacity of 260 MW (Duke Energy 2010). The 
smaller Santa Rita Hydro plant located about 70 km downstream from Cañon del Pato 
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has a generating capacity of 220 MW. According to the National Environment Fund 
(FONAM), the Santa Rita plant is a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) plant that 
would reduce emissions by 810,000 Tons of CO2 per year (FONAM 2009).  
The 2006 General Law on Rural Electrification (Ley General de Electrificación 
Rural Ley No. 28749) supports policies that promote renewable and alternative energy 
and decentralization of resource allocation (MINEM 2008). The primary alternative 
energy sources for rural electrification include solar power and mini/micro hydro power 
plants. International agencies consider hydroelectricity a renewable resource with the 
potential to reduce fossil fuel use and reduce CO2 emissions. In addition, the United 
Nations considers the expanded use of hydropower to be cost effective and without 
market distortions (United Nations 2000).  
 Alan Garcia promised to create a better national future through electrification of 
over 90% of all Peruvian households by 2011. In an op-ed article, El Comercio claims 
Garcia’s effort would create jobs, distribute income, improve the welfare of the 
population, and raise the productive capacity of the country (El Comercio 2010). As 
population increases, demand for energy will rise and it will put more pressure on the 
existing power plants along the Río Santa. To meet electricity demands more water must 
be allocated to the power plants at increasing rates. This further encourages competition 
between highland and coastal demand. A major concern related to hydropower is the rate 
of glacier melt and precipitation changes in the Callejón. Because of these changes, there 
will be less water available for all activities in the future. Reduced hydropower capacity 




2.5.3 Downstream Demand 
Demand for Andean water in coastal areas is growing due to population increases 
(natural increase and migration) and export-agriculture expansion. Chimbote and Trujillo 
are two important coastal cities with increasing water needs for domestic use, coastal 
fisheries, industrial use, and hydroelectricity.8 Large-scale agriculture projects near these 
cities play an important role in exportation to global markets. Two projects, Chavimochic 
and Chinecas, located outside the cities of Chimbote and Trujillo, include 168,000 
hectares of new and improved agricultural land, a majority of which has never been used 
for agriculture. With adoption of Free Trade Agreements with the United States and 
China, these two agricultural projects will gain national importance. 
The Chavimochic project, located in La Libertad, will irrigate 70,000 new 
hectares of desert land and improve more than 74,000 hectares of old systems in the 
valley. This project has attracted the attention and praise from international community 
and organizations, including the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) as a “sustainable” model for development (Chanduvi 2008). There are three 
phases to the project. Phases one and two on the southern end of the project are complete 
and phase three is in development stage (Appendix B). 
The Chavimochic master plan will use water from the Río Santa by constructing a 
pipeline that travels approximately 83.4 km and diverts a majority of the Santa’s water 
about 70 km before it reaches the Pacific. This system transfers water to three seasonal 
rivers — Chao, Viru, and Moche. Large factory farms have been developed for asparagus 
and artichoke production are important for exportation. In addition, the project will 
                                                          
8 Chimbote is the district in with the largest population in the Ancash Region (278,271 in 1993 and 215,817 
in 2007). Trujillo has the largest population in La Libertad Region (247,028 in 1993 and 294,899 in 2007). 
Both areas depend on the Río Santa.  
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generate 68 MW of hydroelectricity and distribute 1,000L/sec. of potable water to the 
City of Trujillo (Chanduvi 2006). Furthermore, Leavell (2008) claims these year-round 
factory farms are estimated to support more than 30,000 full time jobs and have become 
the largest industry in the region.  
The Chinecas Irrigation Project located near Chimbote is projected to expand by 
approximately 24,000 hectares, adding about 10,000 hectares of land not previously 
irrigated (Rosales 2009). For these projects to be successful, a clean and stable water 
source is essential. There are concerns about the current Río Santa flow meeting the 
needs of these two projects, especially in the dry season when the river has limited 
contribution from precipitation and is primarily fed by glacier melt (Painter, 2007; 
Leavell 2008). The 2008 United Nations Human Development Report argues that 
Chavimochic and Chinecas areas are not conducive to constructing reservoirs. This limits 
the potential for capture of precipitation and increases reliance on Andean water (Painter 
2007). However, Chanduvi argues, “The Project is already meeting the challenge of water 
professionals regarding water use efficiency, high return crops, expansion of the 
agricultural frontier, integral and biological pest control, organic fertilization, 
employment generating enterprises, and farmers paying the right water tariffs” (Chanduvi 
2006). This raises questions about how long the Río Santa will be able to support these 
projects. To complicate matters further, two questions that should be asked: 
1) How long before the Río Santa waters lose capacity to meet coastal 
downstream demand of agriculture and hydropower? 
2) What will happen to these irrigation projects, coastal communities, and 
highland communities if the river loses this capacity? 
Reliance on Andean water in coastal irrigation projects further increases 
competition between highland and lowland users. Considering that these projects have 
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the support of the national government and international agencies, policies may be 
created in the future to ensure these projects are allocated sufficient water resources.  
2.5.4 Urbanization  
Urban nuclei throughout the Callejón and along the coast provide the urban 
environment and livelihood for people. The urban population for Ancash grew almost 25 
percent between 1993 and 2007, while there was a slight decrease in the overall rural 
population (INEI 1993; INEI 2007). The Callejón has experienced significant 
urbanization rates. In some cases, these changes have brought development, improved 
sanitation, and electrification. The highlands are primarily rural and populated by a 
handful of cities, small farms, and campesino communities. Provinces of Huaraz and 
Carhuaz (containing the two study areas discussed in chapter five) experienced a high 
rate of urban population increase. In Huaraz, which contains the Capital city, urban 
population grew 47.5 percent between 1993 and 2007, while the urban population in 
Carhuaz grew 36.7 percent. In terms of rural population, there was a significant loss in 
Huaraz, while there was a slight increase in Carhuaz (Table 2.4).  
Growth and urbanization is also occurring within Parque Nacional Huascarán 
boundaries. In total, there are an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 people living in the buffer 
zones and more than 260,000 people inhabiting large towns and rural communities in the 








Table 2.4 Population change in Ancash and select Provinces 
Ancash: Urban and Rural Population. 
Department 







  Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Department of 
Ancash 548,028 406,995 682,954 380,505 24.6 -6.5 
Huaraz Province 74,126 46,902 109,376 38,087 47.5 -18.8 
Carhuaz 
Province 10,871 28,850 14,862 29,040 36.7 0.66 
Source: INEI 1993 and 2007 
According to the Global Environmental Outlook from the United Nations 
Environmental Programme, “Urbanization led to the concentration of domestic and 
industrial solid wastes, air pollution, and problems associated with lack of sewage 
treatment” (as cited in Martinelli, et al. 2006, 21). Urbanization impacts water use 
through increased domestic needs, construction projects, proper sanitation methods, and 
human consumption of water. Martinelli et al. (2006, 22) found that in 2003, Peru ranked 
28 out of 33 Latin American countries in improved sanitation in households. They 
concluded, “the increase in urbanization has not been followed by effective sewage 
collection and treatment. As a consequence, most of the domestic sewage is dumped 
without treatment in water bodies, leading to severe pollution problems”. Sanitation 
issues are important in the Callejón as the campesino communities lack wastewater 
treatment service. However, cities like Huaraz do offer some wastewater treatment and 
garbage disposal, but service is not consistent and there are many individual accounts of 
dumping into the Río Santa. 
The Callejón has varying levels of basic household services. Close to half of the 
rural households in the study area have an indoor water supply. In comparison, close to 
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three-quarters of Chimbote has indoor plumbing (Table 2.5). Household access to a 
wastewater drainage system is especially important for the watershed. Without proper 
sanitation, the wastewater can end up affecting downstream populations.  

















Chimbote 47,747 85.9 88.7 85.1 2.6 
Huaraz 15,169 73.6 67.8 71.8 4.2 
Marcará 2,627 57.2 31.4 59.3 9.0 
Olleros 1,181 52.1 34.9 49.3 6.7 
Source: INEI 2007 
2.5.5 Pollution  
Pollution is a major concern for upstream and downstream users of the Río Santa. 
Although sanitation services are inadequate in the Callejón, the two most serious types of 
pollution are mining and agriculture waste. Throughout the Callejón, there are conflicts 
between communities and mining companies over water contamination. This was evident 
during interviews (see Chapter four).  
2.5.5.1 Mining 
Mining is the largest industry in the highlands and contaminates water through 
acid drainage, illegal dumping, and mine tailings. In 2008, mineral exports accounted for 
63% of Peru’s export revenue (US State Department 2010). The industry is also 
important to the Callejón economy. The region is a major producer of copper, led, zinc, 
gold, and silver. Mining production in Ancash includes numerous mines located in the 
Callejón (Appendix C). Mining operations have been present in the area for many years. 
Their presence has led to contamination by lead, arsenic, and metals, but recent local 
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monitoring has helped reduce contamination (Cornell University and Comunidad 
Campesina de Vicos 2005-2008). 
Studies in the 1970s and 1980s found that most of the rivers draining in to the 
Pacific carried heavy metals, including the Río Santa (Ramírez J. and Barg U. 1990). 
Large and medium mines owned by international and Peruvian companies located in the 
Callejón are regulated by the Ministry of Energy and Mining and are subject to 
environmental regulation. Small and artisanal mines are also present in the Callejón, but 
are not regulated.  
The Pierna Mine owned by Barrick is the largest gold and silver mine in the 
Callejón. Surface mining began in 1998 about 10 km north of Huaraz. According to 
Barrick, the company has 405 employees and 780 contractors (Barrick 2010). There is 
also a large housing complex for mid-level employees just outside of Huaraz. Antamina 
is another gold mine located in the Callejón de Conchucos (also in the Department of 
Ancash), with offices and a strong presence in Huaraz and Ancash. Both mining 
operations are subject to protests and strikes. Conflicts are generally local in nature as 
communities around the mine fight against the negative impacts mining has on water and 
land. Yet, the scale of these operations can also subject to regional concern.  
Smaller mines are scattered throughout the Callejón, including three small mines 
grandfathered into the buffer zone of Huascarán National Park (Cornell University and 
Comunidad Campesina de Vicos 2005-2008). These mines also have environmental 
impacts. One campesino community established a project to help control mining waste. 
The Water Forever Project (Agua Para Siempre), started in 1999 in Vicos with support 
from the Mountain Institute (TMI) and Asociación Urpichallay, has facilitated local and 
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external knowledge transfer and provided low cost monitoring tools. Vicos leaders are 
now responsible for setting the environmental standards for active mines. One condition 
placed upon the mines included community participation in monitoring effluents.  
Small lime mines are located on the road leading to Marcará with additional 
mines on the road leading to Vicos. Small coal mining operations are present on the road 
to Chavin. They do produce livelihood for workers, but according to an op-ed in El 
Peruano, the national government is trying to eliminate these operations because they, 
“poison rivers, destroy the environment, and enslave children”(El Peruano 2010).  
Tailings from abandoned mines, such as the Ticapampa Mine, located south of 
Huaraz are a concern in the Callejón. These sites are environmentally hazardous and 
contain silica and pyrite creating acidic runoff as well as heavy metal contamination that 
affect groundwater (Bird and Alvarez 1997). Further complicating matters, Ticapampa 
has no legal entity responsible for cleanup since the companies that formerly owned the 
mine no longer exist (Personal communication Recharte 2009).  
Gold mining is a source of toxic contamination. Cyanide is used to separate gold 
flakes from ore, leaving a cyanide residue that usually ends up in the water. Bridge 
(2004) found that in general, free cyanide is usually found within a few meters of the site 
of active mining operations; however cyanide complexes have been found up to 50 km 
from the site. Bridge (2004) explains that chemical pollution can occur from the release 
of chemicals during the physical mining extraction, through oxidation of minerals, or 
exposure to air. Contaminants from gold mining have been found near mining operations 
in the Callejón include cyanide, lead, cadmium, copper, arsenic, and mercury (Bridge 
27 
 
2004; Tarras-Wahlberg et al. 2000; Cornell University and Comunidad Campesina de 
Vicos 2005-2008).  
There are both environmental and social impacts associated with mining waste. 
Runoff can affect the soil quality and negatively impact flora and fauna within close 
proximity to the mine. These chemicals have also been found to have negative health 
impacts, such as mercury poising and high toxicity, which had been previously found in 
the Callejón (Cornell University and Comunidad Campesina de Vicos 2005-2008). 
2.5.5.2 Agriculture Wastes 
 Highland campesinos are involved in subsistence farming and provide potatoes, 
corn, quinoa, barley, wheat, oca, and olluco to local and regional markets. The use of 
pesticides and fertilizers for crop production is another source of water pollution. In 
1979, pesticides in Peru have been found to be majority insecticides (74%) and 
fungicides (18%) and were estimated to impact the Río Santa through agricultural runoff 
(Ramírez and Barg 1990). The agriculture runoff from pesticide and fertilizer application 
enters the water cycle and affects surface water and ground water supply. According to 
Ramírez and Barg (1990), chemicals used in fertilizers have been found rivers draining 
into the Pacific, including the Río Santa.  
Interviewees listed agriculture waste as a serious concern (see Chapter four). To 
address this issue Asociación Urpichallay for example, holds community activities 
teaching campesinos to make organic fertilizer and pesticides using plants, spices, and 
less harmful chemicals. These activities help reduce hazardous agricultural waste and 
concerns over water quality issues. These environmental friendly techniques that reduce 
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pests and help nourish crops may play a more important role in the future, as concern for 
water becomes more prevalent.  
Threats to water supply and demand are a real issues facing highland and coastal 
communities. Serious concerns about glacier melt and access to water are present and 
Leavell (2008) estimates glaciers will disappear by 2060. These changes, coupled with 
changing precipitation rates challenge the highland and coastal communities access to 
freshwater resources. Moreover, hydropower capacity will be challenged with changes to 
water flow that threaten the nations’ supply of electricity. Challenges to local water 
management will become more formidable as resources become less stable. The series of 
nested problems will require nested solutions. Because of the critical nature of the 
resource to meet both highland and coastal demands, a solution that satisfies both the 
local population and regional or national agenda will be imperative to the success of local 
water management for campesino communities. Chapter three reviews the framework for 




 FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED GOVERNANCE 
In the Callejón, communities have long-established systems of water 
management. Local management has been especially important for the campesino 
populations who get water in the form of precipitation and glacier melt. Due to harsh 
terrain and long-standing isolation, the state has had little direct influence in the highland 
areas. Instead, there has been a strong reliance on local elected officials to manage water 
(Boelens and Gelles 2005). 
As described in chapter two, there are significant changes in the natural system 
that affect water supply and lead to increasing demand. These changes, coupled with 
national government policies that support productive industries, threaten campesino 
communities’ water management systems. Yet, communities want to keep their local 
management systems that foster traditional uses (usos y costumbres) and satisfy the local 
water needs. Given these changing trends in the natural cycle and the propensity of the 
government to do what is best for productive industries, how can campesino communities 
effectively resist the capture of their resources? A possible solution is to ensure local 
representation at a larger decision-making scale.  
Water is a common-pool resource with characteristics that make it costly to 
exclude users and can lead to rapid resource depletion. Two distinct methods for 
managing common-pool resources include privatization and common property 
management.  
In his classic essay, The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett Hardin (1968) argues 
that common property systems are inimical to sustainable resource use. Hardin notes that 
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each individual who participates in a commons faces strong incentives to over-exploit the 
resource since the costs of such over-exploitation are shared by all while the benefits are 
captured by the individual. Each individual seeking to maximize their own benefits leads 
to overall degradation of the commons through systemic over-exploitation. Hardin’s 
solution is to create incentives at the individual level for proper management by 
instituting a system of private property. He favors private tenure options or taxes that 
make polluting or overuse of a resource too expensive to continue. 
Contrary to Hardin’s belief, scholars argue there are a large number of studies that 
show people are capable of effectively managing common property resources and some 
have a long history of doing so (Ostrom 1990; Trawick 2001; Wiegandt 2008). Ostrom 
(1990) argues that common property resources can be properly managed through 
collective action and collaboration. Common property resource management offers 
numerous advantages. First, common property resource management can help resolve 
conflicts by providing a space to resolve disputes. Second, it can reduce second-order 
conflicts such as the free rider problem, as explained by Olson (1971) when individuals 
either consume more or contribute less to their “fair” share of a resource as defined by 
society leading to suboptimal and unsustainable quantities of these resources. Third, it 
can reduce temptation to violate water access and water rights, and lowers the transaction 
costs through shared oversight where individuals play a role in monitoring. Fourth, 
common property resource management can empower communities by building trust and 
encourage future collaboration. Trust and collaboration can be strengthened through 
multi-lateral communication and joint problem solving. This system has proven 
successful in Switzerland and Brazil, which will be discussed in the following sub-
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sections. In these two cases, reorganization of networks, building of coalitions, and a 
balanced mix of public and private ownership of land and water resources were 
successful in building capacities necessary to allow these communities to engage in 
watershed governance. 
Ostrom (1990) identifies eight principles of successful common-pool resource 
(CPR) management. These principles address the concerns raised by Hardin. 
Characteristics I find particularly relevant to this thesis based on Ostrom include: the way 
water is framed or defined, the participatory decision-making process, governance 
appropriate to the local and regional level, and monitoring and consequences. According 
to Ostrom, water has clearly defined boundaries, yet she assumes that people are rational 
actors and value water differently. She finds that people can effectively manage common 
property resource systems with participatory systems and that systems can be appropriate 
to the local and regional context. These characteristics are most relevant because they 
help identify aspects of management practices that can either remain at the local level or 
can scale up to a regional authority. Thus, I will evaluate local management systems in 
the Callejón and integrated water resource management (IWRM) policies using Ostrom’s 
framework.  
Although, the state has not yet established a private water management system, it 
is appropriate to consider this possibility as private companies play a growing role in 
water management. Currently, local management in the Callejón by-and-large meets the 
needs of the campesino communities. However, the national government is concerned 
about getting adequate supply to the coast where most of the population lives and where 
export agriculture is located. This creates a clear upstream-downstream conflict of 
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interest. Intersectoral competition also threatens the sustainability of water resources. 
Considering the differences in local water management compared to integrated water 
management, it is interesting to see where these practices overlap (i.e. jurisdictional 
boundaries, authority, and interests) and where there is potential for local management to 
scale up decision-making to the watershed level.  
The following section will review Ostrom’s work and eight basic principles of 
common property resource management, from which the four framework characteristics 
of this research are derived. Additional evidence supporting common property resource 
management includes the Brazil and Switzerland cases, which will help further highlight 
the importance of these four principles. Following this discussion, an analysis of the local 
water management and integrated water management will be examined using the four 
characteristics.  
3.1 Common Property Resource Management  
Ostrom’s research helps us understand capabilities and limitations to self-
governance. She proposes an alternative to purely state-based or purely market-based 
solutions. Reviewing three models for dealing with common property resources she 
argues, “at the heart of the tragedy of the commons, prisoner’s dilemma, and collective 
action models is the free-rider problem” (Ostrom 1990, 6). Like Hardin, she assumes that 
actors are rational, but comes to the strikingly different conclusion that common property 
resource management can be successful. She found that successful common property 
resource (CPR) institutions are a mix of “public-like” and “private-like” institutions. 
Ostrom defined success as the ability to enable individuals to achieve productive 
outcomes in situations where temptations to free ride are present (Ostrom 1990).  
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Characteristics of water resources that create opportunities for common property 
management include the inability for water to be clearly divided into individual rights, 
the expense of capital investment and maintenance, and the expense associated with 
enforcement of private property rights. However, collective action poses problems 
including 1) reconciliation of private interests and the public good, 2) control over 
entrance into and prevention from the community of users and 3) maintenance of equity 
and efficiency in governance. 
Moreover, there are high levels of uncertainty in managing common property 
resources. External uncertainties include changes in the natural cycle of water availability 
and varying market prices for water. Internal uncertainty stems from a difficulty in 
defining knowledge, boundary issues, and governance. Concerns about commitment and 
joint monitoring are also an issue; however, Ostrom found several characteristics 
prevalent in robust common property resource management systems in both developed 
and developing countries. Each had “uncertain and complex environments” such as 
irrigation systems where individuals required engineering and farming skills. They also 
had a shared past and expected shared future where “extensive norms” have defined 
proper behavior throughout the years. In addition, each example had different rules based 
on individual and regional diversity (Ostrom 1990, 88-102). Ostrom defined eight 
“design principles” which are “essential elements” in “gaining compliance”. They are:  
1. “Clearly defined boundaries: Individuals or households who have 
rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly 
defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself. 
 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions: Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, 
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and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to 
provision rules requiring labor, material, and/or money. 
 
3. Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the 
operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. 
 
4. Monitoring: Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and 
appropriator behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the 
appropriators.  
 
5. Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are 
likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the 
seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by 
officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both. 
 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials have 
rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among 
appropriators or between appropriators and officials.  
 
7. Minimal recognition of right to organize: The right of appropriators to 
devise their own institutions are not challenged by external 
government authorities. 
 
For CPRs that are parts of larger systems: 
 
8. Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, 
enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are 
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom 1990, 90).  
 
She also found that non-robust management systems had few or weak design principles. 
Due to the “internal and external variables”, individuals were not able to overcome the 
problems of collectively establishing a new set of rules. 
Elinor Ostrom’s work is helpful for understanding the situation in the Callejón. In 
examining the Callejón, four characteristics are most relevant to my research. These 
characteristics focus Ostrom’s eight design principles onto the conditions found in the 
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Callejón. Evaluating both local management and IWRM through these characteristics 
helps to understand campesino communities’ role in watershed governance. These 
elements are particularly relevant because they comprehensively address governance 
issues and concerns. The four characteristics are listed below in bold and then posed as a 
question used to evaluate each system. Following in italics shows how each of Ostrom’s 
eight design principles corresponds to a characteristic.  
1. Value – How is water valued/defined? 
a. Clearly defined boundaries (#1 Ostrom) 
 
2. Participatory Decision Making – Is decision-making participatory? 
a. Collective choice arrangements (#3 Ostrom) 
b. Conflict-resolution mechanisms (#6 Ostrom) 
c. Minimal recognition of right to organize (#7 Ostrom) 
 
3. Appropriate to the local context – Is management appropriate to 
local and regional context? 
a. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions (#2 Ostrom) 
b. Nested enterprises (#8 Ostrom) 
 
4. Ability to identify and measure action and consequences – Is it 
possible to measure action and impose consequences? 
a. Monitoring (#4 Ostrom) 
b. Graduated sanctions (#5 Ostrom) 
 
First, value includes how people view water. This may include productive social, 
religious, or cultural value, how water is measured, and how it is defined. The unit and 
scale is especially important because it is common for individuals to consider the local 
water source without using the watershed as a frame of reference. Clearly defined 
boundaries can help the governance process, although it can also be a source of 
contention among individuals or groups of actors. Second, participatory decision-making 
helps create buy-in from individuals and allows them to play a role in management, 
however large or small the scale. Third, the appropriate local and regional context is 
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important to consider because contradicting policies can be problematic. Fourth, 
monitoring and consequences must be both fair and legitimate to be most effective. 
Again, these policies should be addressed at the local and regional level to encourage 
similar practices and prevent overlap.  
Brazil (Abers 2007) and Switzerland (Wiegandt 2008) are two examples of 
successful common property water management. In the first case, Brazil initiated the 
creation of top-down water basin management, similar to what the passing of the new 
2009 water law. The Swiss system parallels the Callejón. In general, the dissonance 
between upstream and downstream users. An examination of these cases will demonstrate 
how the four characteristics can be managed to produce effective common property 
resource management. A brief description of each case will follow. 
3.1.1 Common Property Resource Management in Brazil  
Abers (2007) studied two river basins in Brazil, where local actors had little 
incentive to participate in governance, where collective identity within the basin was low, 
and where the local population was demobilized prior to the creation of watershed 
governance councils. These two councils were initiated through top-down efforts. The 
Manuelzão Project by the World Bank (Velhas river basin in Minas Gerais state) and the 
Itajaí River Basin Committee by the Santa Catarina state government (Itajaí river basin). 
Each water basin committee was successful in empowering local communities and 
bringing them into the larger decision-making body. According to Abers, the committee 
“established itself as a viable forum for collective action” (Abers 2007, 1457). In 
particular, the incorporation of institutional organizations including NGOs and university 
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volunteers into an “umbrella” organization helped connect large and small partnerships to 
benefit all parties. 
Network expansion — linking different actors, organizations, agencies, and 
institutions at the community, municipal, and regional level — was also critical in 
ensuring effective governance that would be generally accepted. A collective identity 
among members helped organizations understand the problems and “made people 
perceive that the river basin was a relevant territorial space” (Abers 2007, 1458). 
Confidence building through small collaborative efforts was also helpful in building 
“collaborative capabilities at the river basin level” (Abers 2007, 1458). Each small win 
helped them unite as a group and tackle the problem, helping create buy-in and adding 
legitimacy to the organization. Abers found that because the Itajaí basin faced a single 
problem (flood management), the Itajaí Basin Committee could organize at the basin 
level. The Committee took charge of implementing projects based on collective action 
and a shared view of the problem. In the Velhas basin, individuals had a series of 
problems from wastewater and sanitation, pollution, and governance. The scope of these 
problems required the Manuelzão Project to work at the micro-level and help frame the 
problem with local residents as a watershed problem. Confidence building can bolster the 
capacity of organizations, thereby helping communities scale up to effectively participate 
in water basin governance.  
Abers (2007) found three important factors that helped create the capacity of local 
groups to effectively govern at the river basin level in the Velhas basin and Itajaí basin. 
First, the creation of umbrella organizations with university support and institutional 
involvement were important to overcome second-order collective action problems. 
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Second, the cases suggest that if groups are demobilized, river basin governance “must be 
creative and adapted to local circumstances” (Abers 2007, 1459). Communities that can 
build capacity from their internal strengths, rather than worry about the formalities of the 
organization from outside forces, can focus on their strengths to help mobilize others. 
Third, universities have a comparative advantage because they are outside the state, are 
considered experts, have access to water professionals, and can help bridge the 
government and civil society (Abers 2007, 1460). Therefore, the university played a 
significant role in the creation and success of Basin Committees. She concludes her work 
contending that the space for democratic decentralization must be constructed. In her two 
cases, the space was effectively constructed at the river basin level, with a focused frame, 
strong networks and partnerships, and a collective identity helping to ensure legitimacy 
and bolster the records of accomplishment of the River Basin Committees. 
3.1.2 Common Property Resource Management in Valais 
Wiegandt (2008) used a historical example from the canton of Valais (Swiss 
Alps) to explain how communities developed rules and technologies that produced 
efficient and equitable water management. She selected this area for its “persistence and 
apparent effectiveness in regulating scarce natural resources”, and found that, “at the 
heart of the system were incentives that made cooperation preferable to noncooperation” . 
In the 15th century, Valaisians created the first small, local, and collectively managed 
irrigation systems fed by glacier melt. Two factors provided incentives for cooperation 
rather than noncooperation. First, upstream-downstream problems were offset by 
traditional tenure patterns where villagers owned land both upstream and downstream 
(these patterns are also present in the Callejón). This promoted interest in all altitudes and 
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minimized the risk of upstream communities diverting water from downstream 
communities. Second, the high level of infrastructure development and maintenance 
required a level of capital and labor that exceeded household capacities. These factors 
required a more coordinated effort among involved parties. Wiegandt (2008) notes that 
because each community faced the same limitations regarding the capture of resources, 
infrastructure development, maintenance, and management water trade was unlikely. 
Communities were left to their own development and management capabilities with 
minimal intercommunity support.  
The Alpine environment is harsh and unpredictable. To minimize individual and 
community risk, Valaisians held land at different altitudes and in several microclimates 
throughout the region, to ensure crop variability and success.9 Land was also a common-
pool resource. Collectively owned forests, irrigation systems, and high alpine grazing 
land helped further mitigate risk and ensure community success. Wiegandt (2008) found 
that development of both public and private holdings is fundamental in explaining how 
collective resource management succeeded in the area. The coexistence of both public 
and private holdings helped ease the second-order free rider problem for both land and 
water resources.  
 Wiegandt argues that, “both forms of management can provide valuable 
flexibility in institutional response and facilitate adaptation to changing production 
technologies” and concludes that,  
the coexistence and interaction of both common and private property regimes 
has been identified in the case study presented here as a key factor in 
avoidance of resource depletion and in the equitable distribution of resources 
and risks…Once the two coexisted, they were each part of an enlarged set of 
                                                          
9 See John Murra’s (1985) vertical archipelago model in the Andes 
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available strategies to respond to changing environmental, political, or 
economic circumstances (2008, 77).  
 
Cooperative solutions can limit incentives for an individual to capture a majority share of 
resources and to free ride. In Valais, governance was based on a participatory system. 
Each association or community elected a user-manager to oversee management and 
operation of water resources. Wiegandt (2008) notes that there was little information 
asymmetry between the user-managers and the rest of the community due to the small 
size of membership groups, the high probability that a member would become a user-
manager, and the intimate knowledge each member had of the resource and its 
management. She explains, “because of their deep understanding, even when they were 
not part of the managing committee, villagers would closely follow decisions and 
undertake their own surveillance to assure that they received their share of water or 
pasture” (Wiegandt 2008, 74). This decentralized management bolstered the common 
property management system by making it more difficult for individuals or small groups 
to acquire control of the system or resources it governed. Similar to the faena system 
(group cleaning effort) in Peru, Valais communities shared responsibility for cleaning the 
canals and maintaining pastures every year. Wiegandt (2008) argues that participatory 
decision-making not only allocated responsibilities, management, and labor obligations to 
interested parties, but it also encouraged individuals to ensure the use of the resource for 
household and communal benefit.  
Three factors essential to collaborative management based on Wiegandt’s study 
are 1) participatory decision-making within a community, 2) low information asymmetry, 
and 3) balance between public and private land holdings. The Switzerland case is relevant 
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to the Callejón for various reasons. First, both places share similar natural environments 
such as alpine terrain and glacier fed streams. Second, communities in their respective 
country face limitations such as capital and maintenance costs, and sufficient water (in 
some communities) that reduce the potential for water trade. Third, varied land use 
patterns, crop diversity, land holdings are used to mitigate risk in each Alpine 
environment. Fourth, local participation in Valais and the Callejón includes a user-
manager role and intimate knowledge that promotes low information asymmetry about 
irrigation systems helps promote better water use and prevent violations.  
These cases provide additional support and evidence of the four characteristics I 
will use to describe local management and IWRM principles. The Brazil case highlights 
the multitude of water values and how different communities’ can use and value water. 
Second, it shows the potential for participatory decision-making through the creation of 
water basin committees that include representation from a myriad of actors. Third, Abers 
(2007) study shows that the watershed councils addressed the difficult issues of relating 
governance to both the local and regional scale. Fourth, the Brazil case also presents 
evidence that watershed committees can successfully establish establishing rules, 
regulations, and monitoring of water. Moreover, the Swiss case shows that individuals in 
Valais had a similar value of water and that individuals were able to successfully 
distribute water for both individual and communal benefit. Second, the case explains how 
individuals were involved in the decision-making process through participating in the 
construction and maintenance of canals and election into the user-manager role. Third, 
the Swiss case also exhibits the potential for governance that is applicable to both the 
local and regional context. The upstream and downstream allocation of land helped 
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reduce internal conflict and provided is evidence that water can be considered at the 
individual and communal level. Fourth, the case also provides evidence that Valaisians 
effectively identified action and measured consequences. Individuals participated in 
enforcement, had intimate knowledge of the system, and engaged in self-monitoring. The 
rest of the chapter will review two types of water management important for the Callejón. 
First, a discussion of local management will take place. The local system of water 
management based on self-regulating principles is present in campesino communities 
throughout the highlands. Second, integrated water resource management, is the basis for 
Peru’s new 2009 water law.  
3.2 Local water management systems in the Peruvian Highlands 
In the Callejón de Huaylas, campesino communities located at high altitudes are 
the first to use water before it flows into the Río Santa. Drawing on Paul Trawick’s 
research in water use in the Cotahuasi valley of the Department of Arequipa, and my own 
experience in the Callejón, I will first describe Andean irrigation systems and then 
analyze local management applying the four relevant characteristics (value, participatory 
decision-making, appropriate to local and regional context, and monitoring and 
consequences).  
The long-standing agricultural calendar accounts for the altitude and microclimate 
changes in the highlands. The upstream and downstream tensions related to mountain 
terrain, glacier fed irrigation systems, and capital and labor-intensive costs are important 
to consider. More explicitly, issues between local and regional water management are the 
tensions over water transfer among communities in the Callejón. These tensions are 
evidenced by an agreement between the campesino community of Copa Grande and the 
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hamlet (caserio) of Shumay. Local leaders (dirigentes) of each community made the 
agreement but it had not been presented to community members (comuneros). During my 
interviews, reservations about the agreement came up from individuals in Copa Grande 
supplying water. Two interviewees from Copa Grande seemed hesitant about this 
arrangement, explaining the contract had not yet been finalized, pending approval in an 
official community meeting. In contrast, two interviewees from Shumay were happy with 
the arrangement, noting in particular the importance of signing a contract with Copa 
Grande that would keep the agreement in the future, despite changes in local leadership. 
Territorial rights to water are common. Community-based management in many areas is 
only applicable to one community and does not consider outside communities. This 
shows some of the difficulties in collaborating with neighboring communities and raises 
concerns about transitioning to regional context. 10 
Irrigation infrastructure reduces risk for communities by extending the 
agricultural season on the front or back end. Highland irrigation systems include water 
storage at altitude that recharge a network of canals. Canal structures in the Andes 
commonly have two halves where each side is fed by a different water source. Each half 
of the system requires users to take turns rather than irrigate simultaneously. Trawick 
(2001) found the use of dual systems, where the type of water distribution depended on 
scarcity levels. Andean farmers typically have several small plots at varying elevations, at 
different points on the canal, and in each half of the system (Trawick 2001). This helps 
                                                          
10 Labor exchanges were also present with respect to water. In early 2000, the Mayor of Carhuaz, Pepe 
Mejilla, built a civic center in Shumay in exchange for manual labor to dig a canal for potable water in 
Carhuaz. There are most likely additional examples of water exchange, but it did not seem to be prevalent 
in the area. 
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farmers ensure that at least a portion of their crops can be watered successful in times of 
drought.  
There are various systems of water distribution in Andean communities. These 
systems have existed for many years, and according to Trawick (2001), have been 
effective at managing varying volumes of water in periods of abundance and scarcity. 
Some highland irrigation systems are more concentrated and watered with regularity, 
which allows for better individual regulation and monitoring. Individuals can easily 
determine where water is and when they will have access to it. Less concentrated systems 
where water is allocated by land status or by the state is more flexible and dispersed, 
making individual monitoring more difficult.  
Trawick’s (2001) research in the community of Huaynacotas (Cotahuasi valley) 
found that thier system was successful limiting water conflicts, ensuring equity, and 
providing incentives to conserve water. Moreover, he found that although the 
Huaynacotas system is unique, characteristics have been found throughout the highlands. 
According to Trawick (2001) rules of distribution include 1) a fixed sequence based on 
altitude and microclimates where water passes an entire cycle before starting over to 
ensure all households get its share, 2) a rigid order of irrigation based on location rather 
than land ownership or crop, and 3) adjustments to drought conditions are absorbed 
equally among water users. The basic principles of irrigation in Huaynacotas have similar 
components to Ostrom’s (1990) claims of successful common property resource 
management. Basic principles Trawick (2001, 12) found in Huaynacotas are: 




2. Contiguity: Water is distributed to fields in a fixed contiguous order 
based only on their location along successive canals 
 
3. Uniformity: 
a. Among water rights: Everyone receives water with the same 
frequency 
b. In technique: Everyone irrigates in the same way 
 
4. Proportionality (equity): 
a. Among rights: No one can use more water than the amount to 
which the extent of their land entitles them, nor can they 
legally get it more often than everyone else 
b. Among duties: People’s contributions to maintenance must be 
proportional to the amount of irrigated land they have 
 
5. Transparency: Everyone knows the rules, and has the ability to 
confirm, with their own eyes, whether or not those rules are generally 
being obeyed, to detect and denounce any violations that occur 
 
6. Regularity: Things are always done in the same way under conditions 
of scarcity; no exceptions are allowed, and any expansion of irrigation 
is normally prohibited 
 
7. Graduated sanctions: Sanctions for rule violations are imposed by the 
community, and graded according to the gravity of the offence.” 
Trawick (2003) later asserts that these basic principles are, “the best way to get 
people to share the resource and conserve water under conditions of scarcity, providing 
the strongest possible incentive, especially in the small-scale, community-based systems 
found in the sierra of Latin America...”(979). The parallels between the Huaynacotas 
rules and Ostrom’s principles for CPR management are striking and are evidence that 
these systems are operational in some places in the Andes. 
Each year, comuneros elect officials to various community posts. These posts 
were designated by the national government, under the same legislation that recognized 
campesino communities and their right to exist with their own self-management (Ley 
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General de Comunidades Campesinas No 24656). Figure 3.1 shows the different 
community leadership positions related to water.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Community Hierarchies in Water Management  
 
Members of the irrigation committee (comite de regantes) are responsible for 
maintaining infrastructure, designing the irrigation schedule, monitoring water quantity 
and quality, and sanctioning violators. In addition to the comite de regantes, comuneros 
also elect a potable water committee (comite de agua potable). Members of this 
committee are responsible for the provision of water for domestic use. These elected 
representatives are responsible for collecting fees and have the right to impose fines or 
sanctions on water users. The social and health committee (comite de salud y social) also 
has a strong relationship with water management, although does not directly manage 
water. These elected officials are responsible for social and health issues in the 
community. At times, individual or community problems arise with respect to water and 
members of this committee get involved.  
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The President of the Campesino Community (Presidente de la comunidad) is the 
highest ranking elected official within the community. Officials in this position are 
responsible to the community and are involved in all community planning and decisions. 
They are available to resolve community-based conflicts and preside over community 
meetings. The Presidente de la comunidad has an important role in facilitating 
participation in group meetings. The President is involved in water management through 
decision-making and supporting other elected officials. The official position for the 
environment (promotor de medio ambiente) is the most recent position established in 
2005, with the new environmental law. This position is not yet functioning in all 
communities, yet there was interest in many communities I visited. The promotor de 
medio ambiente works with water quality and quantity of the community along with other 
general environmental issues. The elements of the local system that fall within the four 
characteristics of framework for successful governance are discussed below. 
3.2.1 How is water valued? 
For campesinos, water has a cultural and religious as well as an economic value. 
Community members make coca offerings to the springs (puquiales) and pray to the 
mountain gods (los Apus). In the Andean Cosmovisión (Cosmovisión Andina), the 
spiritual world, the environment, and the human world are all connected (Costilla 
personal communication 2009). Water also has economic value for campesinos owing to 
its role in crop production.  
Community leaders (dirigentes) still respect the traditions and cultural norms. 
However, municipal officials do not typically participate in the cultural or religious 
traditions of local communities (Boelens and Gelles 2005). This can lead to dissonance 
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and conflict between the local management and the superimposed state system. This 
situation might become more problematic as state policies pose increasing external 
threats to campesino communities’ access to diminishing water resources. This increases 
competition for water among parties with distinct values. Furthermore, technology 
advancements, access to information, and social adaptation may lead to future changes in 
water values at the local level or possibly incorporate new priorities. These changes may 
help create a new understanding of water that can be helpful for common property 
management. Yet, there may be tensions between the preserving the status quo and 
changing priorities that can hinder the community-based management.  
3.2.2 Is Decision-Making Participatory? 
Water management systems in the Andes entail participatory decision-making by 
comuneros. Members of local water management institutions including the comite de 
regantes, comite de agua potable, comite de salud y social, and promotor del medio 
ambiente, are elected by the general assembly of each community. These representatives 
are given responsibility and authority over infrastructure, allocation, and conflict 
resolution.   
Water distribution is critical to campesino communities. Local systems have rules 
for distribution that recognize seasonal as well as long-term fluctuations in water 
availability (Trawick 2001). As in Valais, there is little information asymmetry among 
comuneros in the Callejón. Most comuneros have intimate knowledge of irrigation 
systems and individual field watering practices. Where there is severe water scarcity, 
everyone does their part to conserve water, under the immediate threat of sanctions as 
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evidenced by my research in Purhuay/Aco Purhuay in the Cordillera Negra.11 Yet, if 
comuneros do not agree with decisions made by elected representatives, they can voice 
their concerns at community meetings. They can also bring issues or concerns to the 
Presidente to help resolve the disagreement. 
Local water management incorporates community participation through 
infrastructure construction and maintenance. During initial construction of a canal, water 
rights are given to members who contribute to the design and construction of the canal. In 
the Callejón, community clean up and maintenance (faena) occur once or twice a year. 
Every comunero with water rights must participate in the faena or are subject to a fine 
levied by the comite de regantes.  
3.2.3 Is governance appropriate to the local and regional context? 
Self-governing water management in campesino communities in the Callejón has 
been present for many years. The comite de regantes is responsible for providing 
adequate water to community members. Because individuals on these committees are 
elected by the comuneros, local needs are likely to be met.  
In highland irrigation systems, water users typically have rights to irrigate a select 
plot in turno (rotation of water). Trawick (2003) argues that although highland 
communities do not have scientific measures for water frequency or volume the turno 
system is long established and has been appropriate. In comparing sustainability of local 
community systems to modern engineering, Trawick (2003) argues that the long-standing 
cooperative strategies are evidence that the local systems have been successful for 
communities. Yet, the dissonance between new western and traditional local measures 
                                                          
11 I found sanctions were strictly enforced in these communities compared to areas with more abundant 
water resources.  
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can pose difficulties between community and regional officials. Competing groups that 
hold different values can change the contextual fit. In addition, the internal changes of 
how an individual or a community values water is also subject to change, which has the 
potential to undermine the traditional system.  
 Despite claims that local water management is successful and appropriate to the 
local context, it has received much criticism from the national government that insists 
that campesinos do not use water to its full potential. President Alan García has openly 
stated that Andean water should support coastal development by supplying water for 
hydropower (2007a). In addition, the government favors large and modern agriculture. 
This suggests the government favors the use of Andean water for more “efficient” 
production. Sectors that bring high revenue or contribute to export production such as the 
Chavimochic and Chinecas irrigation projects are examples of “efficient” water use.  
3.2.4 Is it possible to measure action and impose consequences? 
Harsh Andean terrain makes monitoring water and enforcing rules difficult. Local 
monitoring and enforcement is critical. Some systems allow for more individual 
management than others. Yet, overall, comuneros are intimately aware of irrigation and 
these long-established turnos (turns) that allow for regularity and self-enforcement. 
Community-based management provides more visibility and control over irrigation as 
local residents can easily perform monitoring and vigilance. This creates transparency 
and further decreases information asymmetry among comuneros. However, Trawick 
(2001) found there is potential for breakdown of community-based management if there 
are disproportional rights and duties (Trawick 2001). Furthermore, this breakdown may 
cause locals to resent conflict resolution decisions.  
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Communities use monetary sanctions to deter violations. In some cases, violators 
have been ostracized by the community, which reinforces communal behavior and 
prevents further violations (Trawick 2001). In the Callejón, sanctions and fines are used 
to punish water rule violations; however, the degree of enforcement differs among 
communities. In my research, communities in the Cordillera Blanca appeared to be less 
strict about violations due to the abundance of available water. In contrast, where 
communities in the Cordillera Negra suffer severe water shortages, monitoring and 
imposition of sanctions are stricter. The same holds true for potable water. The comite de 
agua potable is responsible for monitoring use and imposing sanctions. Members of this 
comite ensure that faucets are closed and have authority to cut off water access. However, 
the sanctions and fines appear to only be strictly imposed in the Cordillera Negra.  
The local water management system meets the four characteristics based on 
Ostrom’s principles. Local management reflects the cultural, religious, and economic 
values of water. In addition, it incorporates participatory decision making through 
elections of the local officials (dirigentes) who make rules and carry out enforcement. 
Community members also participate through obligatory work on irrigation 
infrastructure. The local system maintains community traditions and practices and is 
therefore appropriate to the local context.  
However, the present system of managing water does not account for regional 
needs and does not allow for decision-making within a regional context. The fit into both 
the local and regional contexts is critical if communities are to retain their self-governed 
systems. To do so, the watershed must be considered as a unit so that local goals and 
regulations correspond to regional ones. Addressing this gap may allow communities to 
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meet their needs while at the same time supporting watershed initiatives. Lastly, local 
management systems do allow for vigilance and monitoring water use activity and holds 
the authority to impose sanctions on violators. This was shown to be especially true for 
communities in the Cordillera Negra.  
The following section will review integrated water resource management. It will 
discuss the nature of the system and the proclaimed benefits and challenges its 
implementation and management. In addition, an analysis using the four characteristics 
will help compare these two systems: one that caters to the local level and the other that 
addresses regional priorities while at the same time trying to incorporate local needs.  
3.3 Integrated Water Resource Management  
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) has been around since the 
1940’s, but was first comprehensively addressed in 1992 at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro (Biswas 
2004; Carriger 2009). IWRM is an approach that attempts to balance economic 
efficiency, social equity, and environmental sustainability in the face of climate change 
and other threats to water. IWRM is a set of policy prescriptions, rather than a body of 
practice with many international agencies and organizations currently promoting this 
approach. Yet, significant critiques raise concerns about implementation. The approach 
has three coordinated elements: 1) the enabling environment, which includes the general 
framework of national policies, legislation, and rules for stakeholders and managers, 2) 
the institutional roles allocated to different agencies at various scales; and 3) instruments 
for monitoring, enforcing, and decision-making (Figure 2.1). The Global Water 
Partnership (GWP), an organization founded in 1996 by the World Bank, United Nations 
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Development Programme (UNDP), and the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA) to promote IWRM.12 GWP considers IWRM the practice of the future as it 
addresses infrastructure and governance, both the “hard” and “soft” components of water 
management. This approach is intended to apply to the catchment basin or watershed 
level and foster a holistic approach to water management.  
 The Global Water Partnership identified five policy prescriptions that must be 
incorporated to be a successful integrated system. First, IWRM is a holistic approach and 
is a means rather than an end. Second, it is a pragmatic approach that can adapt to meet 
new challenges, barriers, and agendas. Third, it is context-specific: different strategies 
developed can be applied in different local, regional, and national contexts. Fourth, it 
reflects national priorities and is supported by established standards and agencies. 
Integrating IWRM with specific policies (for example, environmental standards and 
Environmental Impact Analysis) and priorities can support this approach. Lastly, it must 
include both infrastructure and management to ensure proper development of systems 
and allocation of resources in parallel (Carriger 2009). 
The Dublin Principles, created by world leaders at the International Conference 
on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in1992, are the guiding principles for IWRM. 
These principles, along with a series of recommendations, were given to representatives 
at the UNCED to develop action programs for water resources and sustainable 
development (ICWE 1992). These principles are as follows:  
                                                          
12 GWP is open to all organizations involved in water management. Political actors that promote IWRM 
include the funding countries: Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. See 
www.gwpforum.org for more information. 
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Principle No. 1: Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential 
to sustain life, development and the environment 
 
Principle No. 2: Water development and management should be based on 
a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at 
all levels 
 
Principle No.3: Women play a central part in the provision, management 
and safeguarding of water 
 
Principle No. 4: Water has an economic value in all its competing uses 
and should be recognized as an economic good 
 
After the Dublin meeting, the leaders at the Rio Earth Summit (UNECD) recognized the 
degradation of freshwater resources and recommended integrated water resource 
planning and management to address water as both a social and economic good,  
“Integrated water resources management is based on the perception of 
water as an integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource, and a social 
and economic good...” (UN Agenda 21, Chapter 18.8). 
 
This integration was designed to cover all types of freshwater bodies, and include aspects 
of both quality and quantity. In addition, the goal was to recognize the multisectoral 
nature of water in development and use, and then apply that understanding to rational 
water management of surface and groundwater supply.  
IWRM is important to this research because Peru’s new water law is based on 
these policy prescriptions. Different organizations have praised IWRM for its holistic 
approach to water management. The World Health Organization (WHO) for example, 
claims that IWRM supports efforts to meeting the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG) such as reducing poverty, promoting gender equality and supporting women, 
reducing child mortality, combating communicable diseases, and improving access to 
55 
 
safe drinking water (WHO 2010). Other agencies such as United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) use IWRM as a tool for adaptation to climate change.  
UNDP highlights a variety of sector-specific benefits and challenges for the 
environment, agriculture, and water supply and sanitation. According to UNDP (2010), 
environmental benefit includes a new recognized voice and raised awareness of the 
environment and ecosystems, a variety of actors uniting to conserve water and 
ecosystems, and spillover effects that can impact other related issues such as 
reforestation, land use, pollution control, and flow capacity. UNDP (2010) claims 
agriculture benefits could be related water reuse of municipal and industrial water as well 
as new relationships between agriculture and food, health, poverty reduction, and gender 
equality as a result of the holistic approach. Lastly, UNDP (2010) asserts water supply 
and sanitation benefits include increased security of water supply for household domestic 
use, minimized treatment cost as a result of improving pollution regulation, and reduced 
conflict. 
 Despite the numerous benefits of IWRM, there are significant challenges to 
successful implementation. The most substantial is Dublin Principle’s definition of water 
as both a human right and an economic good. In general, supporters recognize the 
difficulties in coordinating efforts and making change in policy. Sector specific barriers 
to environment, agriculture, and water and sanitation services are also a concern. UNDP 
(2010) claims environmental challenges include lack of awareness, sustaining political 
will, and limited human and financial resources. In addition, the organization asserts 
barriers in the agricultural sector are related to the incompleteness in water management 
policy, lack of understanding the IWRM principles and management practices, 
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insufficient technical support, and inadequate information. Although, in theory the policy 
prescriptions for IWRM reduce information asymmetry by promoting awareness and 
understanding, power imbalances in water managers and decision-makers are 
problematic. UNDP (2010) claims that sanitation and service challenges include 
coordinating efforts among a variety of agencies and contradicting policies. Attempting 
to manage water without the high transaction costs of doing so require a coordinated 
effort, which can be a significant challenge to develop.  
 A discussion of IWRM presents the policy prescriptions in a general context, 
which applies to Peru’s new water law. Several challenges of water management in Peru 
include meeting water demand in areas with growing population and economic 
development, improving distribution, improving and preserving quality of both surface 
and groundwater, increasing efficient use of water, and minimizing the impact of extreme 
events and climate change on the population and productive sectors (ANA 2009). In 
principle, IWRM will address these challenges while considering the economic, 
environmental, and social needs. The following discussion will help understand IWRM 
through the four framework characteristics for water management based on Ostrom’s 
successful design principles.  
3.3.1 How is water valued? 
In IWRM prescriptions, water is a resource that sustains life. According to the 
first Dublin Principle, it is considered a finite resource with social, environmental, and 
economic values that need to be considered in a comprehensive holistic manner. This 
principle recognizes water in relation to interaction with other natural resources and 
ecosystems, such as land. Water needs to be protected, and the human effects on this 
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resource, both positive and negative, should be recognized (GWP 2000). However, the 
fourth Dublin Principle considers water an economic good and is quite controversial. It 
raises serious concerns over water allocation, especially for the poor. By considering 
water an economic good, during times of scarcity, it allows water to be transferred from a 
low-valued use to a higher-valued use. It raises questions about the ability to be both a 
human right and an economic good. The Global Water Partnership defends the economic 
value position by defining the difference in value and actually charging for water. 
Valuing can be thought of as the opportunity cost method for rational allocation of water, 
while a system for charging fees is the application of an economic instrument that 
changes behavior of the water user (GWP 2000). The Global Water Partnership asserts 
the fairness of economic value because any decision to transfer water use will be based 
on determined priorities. 
It is important to consider that in IWRM, private companies can play a role in 
management, which can realign the understanding of water resources. In private systems, 
water is an economic good, rights to which can be bought, transferred, or sold. 
Developing countries face significant challenges to expanding and maintaining existing 
infrastructure. Therefore, many governments now rely on the private sector to provide 
water access to rapidly growing areas (Gleick et al. 2002). Without a revenue stream for 
water infrastructure, governments cannot provide water for the total population, 
especially the poor. As a result, governments are moving towards pricing policies that 
cover the full cost of water delivery instead of the subsidized cost. As there is still a 
significant gap in services, additional infrastructure development is required, which is 
where the private corporations come in (Landry and Anderson 2010). Privatization may 
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also eliminate inappropriate subsidies. According to Gleick et al., “Shifting responsibility 
to the private sector can lead to prices that better reflect costs and allow governments to 
discontinue subsidies, while letting private providers take most of the heat for price 
increases (2002, 33). 
In Peru, water is the property of the state and authority over water resources is 
located in a single, national organization, the National Water Authority (Autoridad 
Nacional de Aguas, ANA). ANA established 159 hydrologic water basins. The diversity 
of users within these basins increases potential for intrabasin and interbasin conflict. 
ANA along with other government ministries and agencies are aware of the severe 
problems to water faced by the nation.  
The Watershed Advisory Council (Consejo de Cuenca) established by the 
national government is a decision-making body and constitutes part of an integrated 
water resource management (IWRM) system. In Peru, the Consejo de Cuenca establishes 
a participatory decision making space theoretically designed to include representation of 
all users within a watershed. However, there are no policies or mandates that define 
participation or strategies to ensure local leaders are involved in the process. Bureaucratic 
practices and that local water management is under threat, despite the fact campesino 
communities have a right to participate in the decision making body.  
3.3.2 Is Decision-making participatory?  
 Integrated Water Resource Management attempts to streamline authority of 
government agencies to more intersectoral management and encourage participation of 
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community stakeholders. Arguably, this is one of the more difficult aspects of IWRM to 
achieve (GWP 2000).  
Participatory decision-making is addressed in two of the four Dublin Principles. 
The second principle intends to include participation where stakeholders play a role in the 
decision-making process through local communities making supply, management, and 
use-value decisions. However, it is ambiguous and does not specify how users will be 
involved. IWRM assumes, if representatives are democratically elected and if appropriate 
pricing mechanisms are in place, water users can effectively signal their demands. Yet, 
real participation requires an impact on all decisions made, and local communities or 
members involved cannot be used only to justify previously made decisions (GWP 2000). 
All stakeholders must recognize sustainability and consider water holistically to achieve 
consensus. However the Global Water Partnership finds that “participation will not 
always achieve consensus, arbitration or other conflict resolution mechanisms will also 
need to be put in place” (GWP 2000, 16). This is especially true if there is significant 
conflict and divergence amongst the interests and values of different groups. Yet, 
proponents of IWRM assert the creation of participatory mechanisms and the capacity to 
do so is crucial to ensuring participation and representation. They claim it is the 
government’s responsibility to ensure participation takes place (GWP 2000).  
The third Principle attempts to ensure more equitable participation of women in 
IWRM: “women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of 
water” (ICWE 1992). By providing a specific role for women, it suggests that water 
policies will have to be defined to include the values of women and their water use. 
Women play a key role in water use but have less of a role in management. To ensure full 
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participation in IWRM, inclusion of women at all levels of decision-making must be 
guaranteed (GWP 2000). Participatory decision-making is an important concept for 
international agencies in any water management system to bolster support for decisions 
that are acceptable to all participating parties.  
3.3.3 Is governance appropriate to local and regional context? 
In principle, IWRM incorporates all levels of management into the decision-
making process and includes participation by all parties, at the local, regional, and 
national level. By trying to meet needs at each level, it should facilitate making 
appropriate decisions within each scale or context. These policies enable stakeholders to 
participate in the decision-making process and establish use and mechanisms for effective 
water management. The Global Water Partnership describes the enabling environment 
through a top-down and bottom-up management simultaneously. Proponents claim the 
facilitation from both the top and bottom encourages allocation of responsibility to the 
lowest appropriate level (GWP 2000). However, it is not clear who is defined as a 
stakeholder and how this will be effective in practice. 
 Ideally, IWRM would achieve appropriate level of decision-making in the local 
and regional context. Yet Budds (2004) found that this is not always the case. Chile’s 
1981 Water Code for example, has been an exemplar of IWRM, but water governance is 
still  highly politicized in Chile. Budds (2004) argues it is nested in inequality and power-
imbalance, which has become exacerbated by the Water Code. She found that none of the 
benefits of water markets was observed in practice. “Indeed, the present mode of water 
management has had negative socio-environmental implications for peasants in terms of 
reduced access to (legal) water and increased vulnerability to drought” (Budds 2004, 
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336). The number of individuals who illegally obtain water and the number of conflicts 
are not sustainable. Economic benefits and efficiency in water resource management help 
for some but does not apply equally to all (Budds 2004).  
Social equity becomes especially important at the local context, particularly in 
poor communities. According to Gleick et al. (2002), the poor are not against paying a 
reasonable price for water as long as the system provides adequate water and is 
transparent about decision-making. As water is a necessity, individuals want a sense of 
security in water provision, even if it means paying for it, but it is not acceptable to raise 
rates astronomically without providing improved service. Gleick et al. (2002) concludes 
that much opposition over water rate increases happens because there is no public 
education or local input, citing Bolivia’s Water War as an example.  
3.3.4 Is it possible to monitor use and impose consequences? 
The ability to monitor activity and impose sanctions is critical for successful 
IWRM. According to GWP, the government has to create the framework, “within which 
participatory, demand-driven sustainable development can take place” (2000, 34). The 
Government is a regulator and controller ultimately responsible for “policy-making, 
planning, water allocation, monitoring, enforcement, and final conflict resolution” (GWP 
2000, 34). Moreover, the organization argues the ideal position for the government would 
to be less of a service provider, and have more of a regulatory role. Private entities would 
be water providers, leaving the government responsible for flood protection, dam 
construction, and control of glacier lakes.  
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Without regulation, concerns of high prices or inappropriate water quality can 
cause social problems. For example, Gleick et al. (2002) cites inequality in water 1990 
prices in Bolivia between individuals with household connections and others that relied 
on private service vendors. The ability to monitor and enforce rules is important to 
provide legitimacy to the private companies involved in service and distribution. When 
employing private entities in water management, there is consensus that good practices of 
private management include the government regulating private companies to enforce 
laws and regulations (Gleick et al. 2002; Landry and Anderson 2010). Government 
agencies or independent watchdogs can also help monitor the private sector to ensure 
water quality is protected and those who are paying for service do indeed receive the 
service they paid for. Although there is evidence that even poor people are willing to pay 
for water and improved service, the transition to paying the full cost of water (which has 
previously been heavily subsidized by the government) can be difficult as in the case of 
Cochabamba, Bolivia (Gleick et al. 2002; Shultz n.d.). Privatization may have an 
advantage where government is not able to meet basic needs. However, it is in these 
countries that governments are weak and cannot provide the proper oversight of private 
entities for the public benefit (Gleick et al. 2002). Segerfeldt (2005) from the Cato 
Institute, a Washington D.C. based think-tank, recognizes that there are concerns about 
private water markets and that past projects that have not been successful. Yet, he argues 
that this model for water provision can be effective and beneficial to individuals being 
served by the market (2005). This raises the question about who are the individuals 
served by the market. Although the proponents of integrated water management and 
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private enterprises claim needs can be met, attention should also be paid to the 
individuals not served by the market.  
As we can see, in theory IWRM meets all of the four characteristics important to 
successful water management. The integrated system frames water holistically, valuing 
the social, environmental, and economic characteristics. This system is based on 
participation by all players and creates a decision making body at the watershed level. 
However, attempts to address and meet local needs only occur if they are determined to 
be a priority and if awareness is raised about the need to involve all participants. In this 
integrated system, the ability to monitor and sanction abusive behavior is a critical 
component to foster local support. Most importantly, IWRM is a philosophy and a means 
rather than an end in a evolving water management system. This allows management 
practices to adapt a pragmatic approach to address changing needs, values, and priorities 
of water.  
The most appropriate way for both the local and regional officials to meet their 
needs is to ensure participation by local representatives. We have seen that current water 
management practice in the Callejón works well at the local level, but is disassociated 
from regional decision-making. The question is then, how can local management 
practices be scaled up? What are the appropriate practices that must be scaled up and 
what can be left to the lowest levels of management?  
In the Brazil case examined earlier, the water basin committee was a top-down 
mandate. The presence of the university and external actors helped communities frame 
the problem, provided technical assistance, and created small working relationships with 
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the state to ensure effective participation in the decision making process at the watershed 
level. In the Callejón, NGOs work with communities, hosting meetings, activities, and 
field trips. Asociación Urpichallay and The Mountain Institute provide expertise such as 
water monitoring assistance, alternative irrigation techniques, and facilitate information 
dissemination to local campesino communities.13 Urpichallay’s mission is to preserve 
local knowledge and promote dialogue between cultures. Thus, if an opportunity presents 
itself, Asociación Urpichallay and The Mountain Institute can help facilitate 
communication. There is opportunity for communities in the Callejón to borrow from 
successful efforts in Brazil, Switzerland, or other regions in their efforts to scale up local 
participation.  
We see that in theory there is an established space for campesino communities to 
participate in the regional efforts of water management. The Consejo de Cuenca is 
required to include a community representative when the watershed encompasses a 
campesino community (Article 26.3). In 2009, the national government passed a new 
water law (Ley de Recursos Hídricos) focused on integrated management and 
establishing new water authorities. In addition, Peru’s new water law created the Consejo 
de Cuenca for watershed governance. Most important to the discussion of local water 
management capabilities is the creation of the Watershed Advisory Councils (Consejos 
de Cuenca). Although the creation of this advisory council calls for the participation of 
campesino communities and indigenous groups when they are part of watershed territory, 
no mechanisms have been created to ensure representation. This suggests future 
dissonance between watershed management and local management.  
                                                          
13 See Cornell University and Comunidad Campesina de Vicos 2005-2008 
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One of the main concerns among NGOs and local groups is the lack of 
opportunity these communities will have to participate in the decision-making body 
despite the participatory space. This lack of representation may be enhanced by the 
campesino communities’ lack of experience and technical vocabulary required to 
effectively voice their positions within this new decision-making body. To effectively 
deal with this concern, campesino communities need to scale up some aspects of local 
management to fit within the context of the regional decisions. To do this, they need to be 
represented at the decision-making table. If campesino communities cannot effectively 
scale up management of some aspects to work collaboratively with the regional 
government, they will be at risk of losing water resources that will be allocated to other 
highland or lowland users.  
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 CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
As we have seen in chapter three, campesino communities are faced with the 
significant challenge of being represented in the regional watershed councils. To address 
this challenge, I did ethnographic research in the Callejón de Huaylas, during the summer 
of 2009 asking questions about the problems with water, how it is used and managed at 
the local level, and how management can be improved. Qualitative interviews and 
participation in community meetings were the primary methods of data collection. I also 
attended a conference series hosted by Huascarán National Park, walked up to various 
glacier lakes, helped with potato harvesting, attended community festivals, and visited 
archaeological sites. 
4.1 Research Design 
Initially my research questions dealt with collaboration for improved governance 
of the watershed. I planned to first look at opportunities and barriers to collaborative 
management. Second, I intended to examine relationships of trust among water users. 
Third, I planned to look at current practices of water conservation and how these projects 
may help facilitate collaboration. My focus on the ground began to change from 
collaborative governance issues and focused more on the water use and conservation at 
the household and community level. After returning from Peru, I familiarized myself with 
Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) eight principles for successful common property resource 
management. I realized local management in the Callejón had some of these principles. 
Mainly, I was able to identify:  
a. how campesino communities’ frame the current problems associated with 
water resources and management, 
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b. community participation in current water management practices and 
threats to that management within the community,  
c. governance more appropriate to the local and/or regional context, and 
d. ways in which the community measures water use and implements 
consequences. 
Interviews addressed current practices campesino communities’ use and the 
potential for these communities to manage water at the local and regional levels. In 
consultation with Dr. Barbara Lynch and Dr. Jorge Recharte, I selected the districts of 
Marcará and Olleros as case studies based on their locations, accessibility to 
interviewees, and strategic resources. Dr. Barbara Lynch, Professor at Georgia Institute 
of Technology suggested Marcará for 1) the urban-rural dynamic, 2) new urbanization 
and development projects, 3) mining implications, 4) diversity of campesino communities 
in the Cordillera Blanca and Cordillera Negra, and 5) ability to work in collaboration 
with a local NGO, Urpichallay. Dr. Jorge Recharte of The Mountain Institute (TMI) 
suggested an additional case study in the district of Olleros for 1) the dynamic urban rural 
composition; 2) population centers at varying altitudes in the Callejón; 3) local water 
challenges; as well as 4) dynamic economies.  
In 2006, TMI created a pilot program to develop networks and actions connecting 
the sierra and coast for improved water management (“Desarrollo de redes y aciones 
sierra-costa para la gestión de las fuentes de agua en la Cordillera Blanca, Ancash”). 
This program aims to benefit individuals that live within the Santa watershed. The sierra-
coast project focuses on developing public awareness and relationships among local 
institutions and businesses responsible for good ecosystem management (Recharte 2006).  
Interviews in these two districts provided an opportunity for me to examine 
various factors such as local environments and potential threats, existing and potential 
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networks, opportunities for collaboration and the need to scale up to a higher authority. 
Upstream-downstream competition occurs in both districts. I also found tensions between 
communities within a short distance from each other. Furthermore, districts compete for 
resources with the regional capital, Huaraz. As the city of Huaraz continues to grow in 
population and size, the city will require more demand for energy and water from the Río 
Santa. 
4.1.1 Methodology 
Qualitative interviews were conducted to encourage campesinos to share their 
views on the governance, use, management, and needs of water resources. Using Rubin 
and Rubin’s (2005) guidelines for qualitative interviewing, individuals were considered 
“conversational partners”. This helped frame my interviews as an in-depth conversation, 
rather than the traditional interviewer and interviewee relationship (See Appendix D for 
interview guideline).14 I used two different techniques to collect data from interviewees. 
The key informant technique was used primarily to establish a list of key individuals 
related to water resources and governance issues. The snowball sampling technique was 
used to ensure access to the most relevant individuals in the area. The use of these two 
methods resulted in interviews with local and regional experts important to water 
resources in the Callejón.  
4.1.1.1 Key Informants 
Key informants are individuals knowledgeable about the subject and able to 
provide insight, ideas, and critical information to the research. This was the first 
                                                          
14 Interview guidelines were modeled after Rubin and Rubin’s (2005) work, Qualitative interviewing: The 
art of hearing data. Chapters on 8 and 9 titled, Designing main questions and probes, and Preparing follow 
up questions were particularly helpful.  
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technique used in the study. USAID uses key informants in comprehensive qualitative 
study design and finds that key informants are important, especially,  
“when general descriptive information is insufficient for decision making, 
when understanding of the underlying motivations and attitudes of a target 
population is required, when quantitative data collected through other methods 
need to be interpreted, when the primary purpose of the study is to generate 
suggestions and recommendations, and when preliminary studies are needed for 
the design of a comprehensive quantitative study” (Kumar 1989; 2-3).  
 
Advantages of using key informants include the ability to collect insights and in 
depth responses, gather examples from personal experience, improve flexibility to new 
ideas, better address issues not anticipated in the research design or interview guide, and 
can be an inexpensive method for data collection. Disadvantages of the key informant 
method include the lack of quantification on any subject, selection bias, interviewee bias, 
and validity of information provided may be hard to prove (Kumar 1989; 2-3). 15  
4.1.1.2 Snowball Sampling 
Referral sampling was developed to sample target populations that comprise small 
sub-groups of a larger population. Snowball sampling is a type of referral sampling and 
the second technique used in research design to identify and interview all relevant 
individuals. This was especially important when conducting interviews in campesino 
communities. Snowball sampling uses a process of “chain referral” that Singleton and 
Straits (1999) define as asking the targeted population to provide contact information of 
other individuals in the target population creating a continuous cycle. The authors note 
                                                          
15 UCLA Center for Health Policy Research and the University of Illinois Extension each have documents 
containing similar information to the USAID report on key informants in developing countries. See 
http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/HealthData/ttt_prog24.pdf and 
http://ppa.aces.uiuc.edu/pdf_files/Informant1.PDF for more information. 
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that the quality of the sample depends greatly on the initial contacts to start the chains 
(Singleton and Straits 1999, 163).  
4.1.1.3 Participant Observation 
It is important to emphasize that during the research collection phase, I was a 
participant observer: I attended community meetings, seminars, and other organized 
activities that shaped my interpretation of the social and political environments in the 
highland areas. It helped me identify problems I had not previously recognized and 
enabled me to meet potential key informants. By attending these events, it made others 
aware of my presence and I became familiar with many local actors. My lack of previousl 
involvement with Andean Communities may have caused some reluctance among 
interviewees in talking with me. However, my association with two reputable NGOs that 
have a long history of working in the area may have reduced hesitation in the willingness 
of individuals to meet with me. My associations may have also reduced discrepancies, 
such as individuals telling me what they thought I wanted to hear, rather than what was 
most important to them or their community.  
4.2 Characteristics of Interviews 
This study was completed using primary data from 34 interviews: campesino 
community members (comuneros), community leaders (dirigentes), government officials, 
and members of local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). With 
the help of field staff from Asociación Urpichallay and The Mountain Institute, I drew up 
an initial list of relevant individuals to interview in each campesino community, 
township, village, and large urban area. This list included members from the comite de 
regantes, comite de agua potable, comite de medio ambiente, and comite de salud y 
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social. Although they do not form part of the local, regional, or national government: 
they have the right to establish rules and penalties within their respective communities. 
Government actors — mayors and civil service personnel, local water authority (ALA) 
representatives — strategic planning consultants, tourism industry employees, and NGO 
personnel, were also interviewed. Of the thirty-four total interviews, 19 were from the 
campesino communities, 11 from local or regional governments, and 4 were NGO 
representatives or consultants (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of Interviewees 
Characteristic Marcará Olleros Other Total 
Gender 
Women 7 0 2 9 
Men 16 3 5 25 
Total       34 
Geographic Location 
Rural 18 1 0 20 
Urban 6 1 0 6 
Other 1 0 7 8 
Total       34 
Position Held 
State Official 6 1 5 11 
Community Member 7 0 0 7 
Community Leader 10 2 0 12 
NGO 2 0 2 4 
Total       34 
 
4.2.1 Data Sources 
Data collection included secondary sources from the respective websites of the 
various Peruvian Ministries and agencies including Ministry of Energy and Mines 
(MINEM), National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI), Ministry of 
Environment (MINAM), and the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG). I collected this data 
from the websites; however, additional data was given to me during interviews with 
representatives from these agencies.   
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4.2.2 Ethics and Limitations 
There are various ethical concerns to consider in evaluating collaboration and 
water management. First, discussions with each NGO and their respective missions and 
goals impacted the study and quality of the interviews. The interactions and relationships 
between the NGOs and the communities may have also influenced my analysis of 
interview responses. However, in my experience, the relationships between these 
organizations and the communities in which they work were positive. The Mountain 
Institute (TMI) is an international NGO committed to “empowering mountain 
communities and conserving mountain ecosystems” (TMI 2010). TMI seeks to integrate 
economic development and environmental stewardship by forging long-term 
commitments, focusing on teamwork and collaboration, improving cultural sensitivity, 
and increasing accountability. Asociación Urpichallay is a local NGO in the town of 
Marcará. The organization focuses on strengthening Andean culture by collecting 
information, technology, and values of indigenous populations and of their ancestors. 
Urpichallay’s mission is to revalue Andean knowledge and technology to improve the 
quality of life for the rural populations (Urpichallay 2010).  
I was not able to conduct all of the interviews I hoped to at the beginning of the 
study. Limited transportation and telephone access made getting some interviews 
difficult. Time constraints were another factor. In 2009, there were numerous regional 
and national strikes and protests between May and August. For safety reasons, I did not 
interview during these protests. Peruvian Independence Day festivities also made 
interviewing the last week in July difficult; however, I was able to meet with a few 
individuals working that week.  
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A second limitation was communication  with monolingual Quechua speakers. A 
staff member from Urpichallay and a local university student accompanied me to all 
interviews in campesino communities in Marcará and Olleros. Assistance was especially 
important in meetings with women because most spoke little Spanish. In these cases, my 
assistant clarified the question and repeated the answer back to me in Spanish. Although 
most of my interviewees were male and spoke Spanish, my assistant was able to help 
clarify questions and help them elaborate further in Quechua. In Olleros, most 
campesinos spoke Spanish and Quechua, so there was less of a communication barrier.  
Figure 4.1 shows the location of the two study areas. Both districts are primarily 
located on the east side of the Río Santa and in the Cordillera Blanca. However, a small 
portion of the District of Marcará is located on the west bank of the Río Santa in the 
Cordillera Negra.  
 
Source: Elaborated by Author 2009 





4.2.3 District of Marcará  
The District of Marcará, positioned in the Province of Carhuaz, is located 
approximately 20 Km north of Huaraz. The town of Marcará is located at an elevation of 
2,750 meters above sea level (9,000ft.), with surrounding townships and rural 
communities at higher altitudes (Figure 4.2). The campesino communities are primarily 
Quechua speaking, although most men speak Spanish. I worked mainly in centrally 
located communities due to time and accessibility constraints. With the advice of the field 
expert from Urpichallay, I conducted interviews in five campesino communities: Copa 
Grande, Purhuay/Aco Purhuay, Recuayhuanca, Shumay, and Vicos and in one urban 
center, Marcará. Many of the campesino communities are comprised of caserios, small 
hamlets that are not large enough to constitute its own village. With the exception of the 
town of Marcará, the other five areas in the district of Marcará are rural. The town of 
Marcará is located along the main road that runs through the Callejón (Highway 3N) 
parallel to the river. Purhuay is located on the west side of the Río Santa and is about 20 
minutes from the village of Marcará. Table 4.2 shows the community characteristics of 
study areas in Marcará.  
Table 4.2 Study Areas in the District of Marcará 
Name Classification  Households Population 
Marcará Urban 371 1,285 
Copa Grande Rural 78 295 
Purhuay Rural 45 192 
Shumay Rural 193 576 
Vicos Rural 286 977 
Recuayhuanca Rural 100 317 
Dispersed 
Population  564 1,595 




Between 1993 and 2007, the total population of the District of Marcará grew. 
There was a significant increase in the urban population and slight increase in the rural 
population. Table 4.3 shows the total population change for both urban and rural areas in 
this district. 
Table 4.3 District of Marcará Population Change 1993-2007 
  1993 2007   
Area Total % Total 2007 % Total 
% Change 
1993-2007 
Urban 1,000 12.98 1,285 14.88 28.50 
Rural 6,704 87.02 7,349 85.12 9.62 
Total 7,704 100 8,634 100 12.07 
Source: INEI 1993 and 2007 
Water use in Marcará is mainly for human consumption, livestock, and 
agriculture. The economy of this area is based on corn, potato, wheat, peas, beans, and 
quinoa production for local consumption. The mining industry is an important water user 
and economic factor for the area as well. Non-metallic lime mines (Caleria Marcará, 
Caleria Santa, and Calirumi) are small, informal operations located adjacent to Highway 
3N and off the side of the road leading to Vicos. Metal mines (Mina Caudalosa, Toma la 
Mano, and the closed mine Mina Garrosa) are located at high elevations in the Quebrada 
Honda. These mines are within limits of the Vicos community. 
4.2.4 District of Olleros 
The second district in this study is Olleros, in the province of Recuay. Olleros is 
situated approximately 25 Km south of Huaraz at an altitude of 3,450 meters above sea 
level (11,300ft.). In consultation with a field expert from TMI, Canrey Chico and Olleros 
were the two locations selected for the case study. Data on Canrey Chico is not available 
from INEI because it is not recognized as an official campesino community. According to 
Ley No 27795 “Ley de Demarcación y Organización Territorial”, a population center 
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(Centro Poblado, CCPP) must have at least 151 residents in individual households. If a 
campesino community does not meet this condition, it is considered a dispersed 
population (INEI 2007). Between 1993 and 2007, Olleros lost both urban and rural 
population (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 District of Olleros Population Change 1993-2007 
  1993 2007   
Area Total % Total 2007 % Total 
% Change 
1993-2007 
Urban 1,623 47.29 1,392 53.93 -14.23 
Rural 1,809 52.71 1,189 46.07 -34.27 
Total 3,432 100.00 2,581 100 -24.80 
Source: INEI 1993 and 2007 
The economy of Olleros includes forestry, livestock, and the cultivation of potatoes and 
other tubers, wheat and barley. Water is used for domestic consumption, agriculture, and 
livestock. 
4.3 Results 
Water is typically used for agriculture and domestic consumption in these study 
areas, which holds true for most areas throughout the Callejón. In analyzing my interview 
data, I tried to capture a sense of the four characteristics discussed in chapter three. Each 
of these four characteristics will be discussed in detail specific to the Callejón 
communities. Important to note, questions of water value were not in my interview 
guidelines. However, I did ask about problems related to water. This does not directly 
address how water is valued, although some responses were explicit in water value but 
were answered through different questions. Examples and quotes will be used to portray 




4.3.1 Defining the problem 
The first question I asked was about problem identification:  
1) What are the problems with water? 
 
I sought information not only about how informants saw current issues, but also about 
trends in water availability and insight as to what is changing. Twenty-seven respondents 
answered the problem-framing question, and based on their responses I was able to define 
six primary issues, (eleven in total) these categories include contamination, management, 
solid waste pollution, infrastructure, information, and climate change (Table 4.5). These 
problems pose concern for future health and environment of these communities.  
Table 4.5 Problems with Water 
Problems with water Total Responses % Respondents 
Contamination 8 30 
Poor Management 7 26 
Infrastructure problems 6 22 
Solid waste 6 22 
Lack of information 5 19 
Climate change 5 19 
General concern about water resources 5 19 
Other 5 19 
Health concerns 3 11 
Lack of potable water 3 11 
Concerns about small streams 3 11 
      
Total Respondents 27   
 
4.3.1.1 Contamination 
Contamination was the problem identified by most interviewees. Eight individuals 
noted this as a problem, citing examples ranging from mining, pesticides, and vehicle 
toxins. Individuals who noted that contamination was a problem, were primarily male (6 
out of 8 total) and most lived in a campesino community. A state representative in 
Marcará mentioned the increased volume in toxins from vehicle use, while an NGO 
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representative noted agriculture and mining wastes were problematic. One woman who 
complained about contamination was a representative of the Club de Madres (the national 
social assistance organization for women with children). Her concern was related to 
health issues in the area. It appeared to me that worries about contamination were 
common among many of the individuals interviewed, which may be a result of the 
economy of the area as most individuals participate in farming activity and mining is a 
dominant industry in the region. Yet, their concerns are not without merit. The Agua 
Para Siempre project found high acidity and metal particles in highland streams (Cornell 
University and Comunidad Campesina de Vicos 2010). Tests further downstream 
revealed that the pH and conductivity were less, allowing for human and animal 
consumption further down the river. However, this is still a concern for campesino 
communities who use the high pastures for crops and grazing.  
4.3.1.2 Poor Management  
State representatives, local officials, and local campesino leaders noted poor 
management of water resources as a major concern. Seven interviewees gave various 
reasons as to why management was problematic such as, sectorized management, lack of 
standards, unresponsive state representatives, and lack of management by enterprises and 
businesses in the area. One woman who noted the poor management was a local elected 
community leader and explained the inconsistency with the payment system. She 
suggested the use of receipts could help management.  
According to the director of the Huascarán National Park, the limited number of 
visitor checkpoints and park rangers created problems in monitoring visitors, leading to 
large amounts of garbage left behind. Two representatives from the local water authority 
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(ALA) contend that management was a problem because it had been sectorized in the 
past. Agencies did not communicate and had contradicting or confusing rules. They 
explained that the new water law passed in March of 2009 is significant because it 
requires coordinating efforts and includes participation of campesino communities 
because they are defined as water users by the state. They also noted the new national 
water authority (ANA) was a step in the right direction to improved integrated water 
management. Other individuals in the area seemed more skeptical of the new water law 
and did not appear confident that there would be local representation.  
In contrast, two communities leaders from the District of Marcará explained that 
they have asked for help, but no agency responds to their needs. They revealed their 
frustration with state officials through various stories of soliciting help to the local 
government without any response. Community leaders in the District of Olleros 
mentioned the negligence of businesses with regards to water and a lack of standard 
enforcement resulting in overall neglect of the water supply. They discussed the need to 
enforce standards for companies working in the area and explained that regulation is 
necessary to make environmental improvements. 
Two additional examples provided by women in Marcará are relevant to this 
discussion. However, the conversation took place in response to a different question (so 
these responses are not counted in 4.1). These two women explained to me that there is a 
community post to take care of the potable water tanks but there is no oversight to ensure 
the job is done properly. One woman complained that sometimes the individual in charge 
would leave for a period of time without transferring his duties. The second woman 
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addressed the concern of mistaking untreated water for potable water, because the person 
in charge of treating the water was not always fulfilling his/her duties.  
There also appeared to be a general distrust of engineers working in the area 
(Again, results are not represented in table 4.1). About 10-15 interviewees mentioned the 
poor experience of working with engineers. These interviewees were primarily 
campesino community leaders who explained the engineers were either not qualified or 
did a poor job in designing or maintaining infrastructure.  
In general, the lack of care for water by responsible persons is a problem for local 
officials. However, we can see that there is some difference in the responses between 
state leaders and campesino community leaders. Overall, the state leaders recognized 
poor management, but seemed very confident that the new water law is an appropriate 
solution. In contrast, campesino community leaders took issue with state agencies and 
engineers not adequately addressing the problems in the highlands. Local leaders and 
comuneros recognized poor management practices at the local and regional level.  
4.3.1.3 Infrastructure problems 
 Six individuals said that infrastructure was a problem. Interviewees were located 
in both rural and urban areas within the District of Marcará and two were female local 
leaders. Five of six respondents listed specific infrastructure concerns related to domestic 
water and sewage. Interviewees mentioned old tubing and systems, tubes not supplying 
enough water or were not properly expanded, lack of basic sanitary systems, and lack of 
wastewater treatment. The sixth respondent from Huascaran National Park (PNH), talked 
about problems with irrigation infrastructure. He pointed out that many campesino 
communities want lined canals. The major problem for the PNH is the cement-lined 
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canals within park borders. He said they contribute to soil and vegetation deterioration. 
Community members prefer cement canals, explaining that the “rustic” canals break 
easily and cause more problems with water flow than cement canals. This will be 
explained in further detail below, in management practices appropriate to local and 
regional contexts (section 4.3.3).  
4.3.1.4 Solid Waste 
 Interviewees were also concerned about garbage or solid waste in the area. Six 
individuals noted that garbage, such as plastics and food wrappers were dumped into 
canals, streams, and the river. Interviewees in Copa Grande explained that some of the 
trash left toxins and residues that impacted the health of children. Solid waste is visible 
along riverbanks, and in streams and other water sources. One woman from Marcará 
called the river a garbage bin. Traditionally, Peruvians have reused many products; 
however, the increase in plastics is problematic because unlike metal it cannot be reused. 
Many people in the Callejón are aware of this change. I had informal conversations at 
local markets about the use of plastic bags and changes in packaging. I was told that 
people used to reuse bags for rice and other grains. Products such as flower were 
packaged in paper, which was then reused inside the home. However, in the 1990’s, 
packaging changed, and vendors switched to plastic bags.  
Garbage is a problem in villages and townships throughout the Callejón due to the 
absence of sanitary landfills or designated dumps. There are limited landfills outside of 
Huaraz, but they generally do not collect garbage from campesino communities or 
outside urban areas. Huaraz is the only area with the infrastructure for collection, 
transport, and disposal. A visit to one of the waste treatment plants for Huaraz helped me 
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understand the nature of waste storage in the area. This particular landfill held a dump, 
recycling center and compost that provided soil for municipal projects.  
Towns and communities outside of Huaraz face a very different situation. There 
are trash bins in the center of Vicos and Copa Grande, but it was not very clear to me 
what happens besides the occasional garbage collection. I met one man in Olleros who 
made his own garbage receptacle and took it to the garbage dump in another community 
across the main road. Issues of solid waste come into play in environmental and water 
discussions in the Callejón. In 2009, Urpichallay worked with local officials to facilitate 
discussion about water resources and specifically address the need for solid waste 
collection and storage services.  
4.3.1.5 Lack of Information 
 Five male respondents mentioned the lack of information as a serious concern for 
water management. A majority were state representatives or individuals who worked 
closely with the state in their official local capacity, except for one NGO representative. 
The local officials explained that individuals do not know how to take proper care of 
water, stating, “people are not accustomed to care for water” and “people don’t take the 
situation seriously”. One individual who worked with water resources in a local 
community said, “most people don’t take care of water resources. There are plenty of 
opportunities to implement technical irrigation systems but they don’t do it”.16 Further 
probing of this response was difficult, as most individuals did not thoroughly respond to 
related questions. 
                                                          
16 I use the terms technical irrigation and riego tecnificado throughout this chapter. The term riego 
tecnificado was used by many of my interviewees. My use of this term does not imply that communities in 
the Callejón lack technology or technical irrigation systems. Here it only is used to describe more 
conservative measures as mentioned to me by my interviewees.  
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4.3.1.6 Climate Change 
Climate change was a problem identified by five respondents. Most individuals 
who cited climate change as an issue saw the changes from when they were young. When 
asked about specifics, respondents said they noticed the diminishing glaciers, melting of 
the ice, and are concerned about the disappearance of water in 20-30 years. The Director 
of PNH explained that the significant increase in glacier recession is related to global 
climate change, which cannot effectively be addressed at the local level. However, he 
argued that the best strategy for dealing with climate change at the local level is 
reforestation and land cover improvement.  
Local leaders, government officials, and NGO representatives define the problem 
of water differently. It is interesting to note that many of the top problems for 
interviewees (except for climate change) may be addressed at the state level with 
regulation and enforcement; however interviews suggest local oversight might be useful. 
Contamination from mining is regulated by the state, but the concerns about mining 
waste present at the local level suggest that enforcement is not adequate. Poor 
management of water resources appears to occur at both the local and state level. Local 
residents cited mismanagement by the local officials responsible for potable water and 
mentioned the engineers and lack of state responsiveness as problems with management. 
Garbage is primarily a storage issue because there is no designated area for communities 
in the Callejón to store waste. Local communities could establish a proper dumping site; 
however, they would most likely need state approval and assistance in developing a site 
and implementing collecting or transport of waste. Infrastructure problems are related to 
domestic water and irrigation water. With respect to irrigation, there are differing views 
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about construction materials used and will be discussed in the following sections. Lack of 
information can be addressed at both the local and state level. Information at the state 
level must be properly disseminated. However, challenges to information sharing include 
language and technical terminology which can prove to be difficult barriers.  
4.3.2 How do individuals participate in local water management? 
There are two distinct problems in Marcará and Olleros. Marcará contains 
communities with both ample resources and severe scarcity while Olleros suffers from 
natural contamination of the river. In Marcará, most communities, townships, and 
villages have ample water. Yet communities like Purhuay/Aco Purhuay in the Cordillera 
Negra have experienced many years with water scarcity. The Cordillera Negra has no 
glacier melt and can only use rainwater for irrigation. As a result of rain dependence, 
residents of this community are well informed about water conservation techniques. 
Communities in the Cordillera Blanca still have water and most of their problems are 
related to contamination from solid waste, plastics, and mining waste.  
The district of Olleros is located in the Cordillera Blanca and has sufficient water. 
Its main problems are natural contamination of the Río Negro and changes in stream 
locations due to the 1970 earthquake. Campesino communities in Olleros are finding 
water in new places, and areas where they used to get water are now dry. Natural 
contamination of the Río Negro is due to iron in the rocks the river passes through. 
According to the community leaders (dirigentes) of Canrey Chico, in the last 5 to 10 
years, the pH levels have changed, and comuneros can no longer use the river to irrigate. 




Local government officials, campesinos, local community leaders, and NGOs 
were asked questions about how they participate in water management at the individual, 
household, and local level. This included keeping water clean, conserving water, and 
ensuring water availability. Responses were categorized into 14 different activities.  











Use reservoirs for stable water source 
Improve canal system 
Improve water waste system 
Unite streams 
Make and  use garbage can 
Incorporate technical irrigation 
2 Nothing 7 30 
People do not know how to take care of water 
Little or no activity  
Some waste water during irrigation 
It's hard to care for water when there is no water 
3 Group cleaning effort (Faena) 6 25 
Clean canals in designated section (topo) 
Women prepare food while men clean canals 






Close the faucet 
Maintain community water tanks 
Maintain potable water tubes 
Use Chloride 
6 Use responsibly 5 21 
Do not wash where water originates 
Use responsibly (i.e. Shower, bathroom, kitchen  
Avoid using fertilizers and insecticides in the 
stream 
7 Boil water 3 13   
8 Educate and teach 3 13 
Educate Children 
Meet with MINAG 
9 Store water 3 13 Store water in bins 








treatment plant 1 4   




(los Apus) 1 4   
          
  Total Responses 24     
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Many respondents provided specific examples as to how the individual, 
household, or community manages water. Eight informants saw the job of local water 
management as constructing or maintaining infrastructure. Seven interviewees were 
male, except for one female in a leadership role. The female interviewee paid particular 
attention to poor tubing in potable water systems and participated in water management 
by helping maintain infrastructure. Men lived  in rural areas and all but one had an 
official  leadership role in the community. They participated in local water management 
by uniting small streams, constructing septic tanks and potable water systems, and using 
reservoirs. One state representative in the District of Marcará said the state assists with 
canal and waste water improvements. Seven said that the pravailing approach to water 
management is to do nothing and maintain the status quo.  
Overall, respondents said that there was little or bad administration of water. As 
noted above (section 4.3.1), respondents cited poor management as a problem for water 
resources. Yet, seven interviewees said that the majority of the population does nothing 
or does not know how to take care of water. Two comuneros claimed to do nothing 
special for water management, while one respondent said that some people waste water 
during irrigation. One government official also said, “individuals did little or nothing for 
water management and that people don’t know how to properly care for water”. The last 
four respondents were local community leaders. Three from Marcará said “it was difficult 
to care for water when there was no water and that people don’t always take good care of 
water resources”. One local leader in Olleros said there was nothing the community could 
do because the contamination was natural and not related to local activity. 
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Six interviewees talked about the faena or group maintenance effort. This 
typically happens once or twice a year, and all community members who have access to 
water are obligated to either participate in the faena or pay a fine.  Interviewees were all 
men, located in both rural and urban areas. They included both comuneros and local 
leaders (irrigation and environmental committees). One was an engineer in the planning 
department of Recuay. The system of the minka, a reciprocity based system that had been 
prevelant in the Callejón, does not appear to be active in many communities.17 
Traditionally, women would make a meal while men cleaned canals. This is still present 
in Recuay, but, not practiced in campesino communties in Marcará. It was however, a 
suggestion made by a comunero in Vicos as an opportunity to link communities together 
for infrastructure improvements.  
Participation practices noted by another six interviewees was irrigating according 
to rules set by the comite de regantes. All six respondents were male and living in rural 
areas; four were local leaders, and two were community members. Both community 
members and local leaders from the comite de regantes said that just following the rules 
established by the comite de regantes was good management practice. Yet, one comunero 
from Marcará felt that using his own system of potable water for irrigating his garden 
was more appropriate because the water was better than that coming directly from the 
canal or the river because of contaminants. In addition, interviewees in Canrey Chico said 
that good water mangement practices for the area included using the streams for 
irrigation rather than the river due to the iron contamination.   
Maintaining potable water systems is the last management practice discussed in 
detail. Five interviewees noted that maintaining potable water systems was an important 
                                                          
17 Sometimes the minka and faena are used interchangeably. 
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aspect to water management. These individuals provided mostly household or commnity 
level activities that were used in this practice. Two respondents were female, one was a 
local elected leader. Their responses included closing the household faucet and adding 
choride and properly maintaining potable water tanks at the communty level. The three 
male respondents were local leaders in the District of Marcara, both in the Cordillera 
Blanca and Cordillera Negra. They mentioned that closing faucets were important, and 
the respondent from Purhuay/AcoPurhuay said that they impose sanctions to maintain 
potable water. It is interesting to note the only community that sanctions individuals for 
poor water use is Purhuay/Aco Purhuay. The representative explained to me that after 
three warnings for poor use, the local authority cuts access to water. The problem with 
water is so severe in this area that each year the community has to unite streams in order 
to form one solid steady stream of water. The local potable water and irrigatior officials 
confirmed that sometimes three or four streams had to be joined together.  
The sixth response included general activities for example, using water 
responsiby. Interviewees in rural areas mentioned  that washing away from the opening 
of the stream and not putting pesticides or fertalizers too close to the canal were 
responsible ways to use water. A representative in Copa Grande and Purhuay/Aco Purhay 
said that within their communities, people do a pretty good job of taking ware of water 
resources and used water with caution.  
Additional practices (responses 7-14) include boiling water, educating children, 
and conversing with MINAG representitives, and harvesting and storing water 
(techniques mentioned by both comuneros and NGO representatives). Storage techniques 
at the individual level can be fairly simple such as storing water in bins for later use. In 
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contrast, the NGO representative discussed with me the potential of new methods for 
capturing rain droplets in the air. Other water management techniques that have the 
support of the state include solid waste treatment plants and potable water treatment 
plants. The Mayor of Marcará noted that the construction of solid waste treatment plants 
and potable water treatment plants are good water management practices. The last 
practice mentioned, responds to the religious ideals present in the area. One male 
comunero in the Comuidad Campesina de Vicos mentioned that it was common for 
Vicosinos to pray to the Mountain Gods (los Apus) for water.  
In sum, there are various water management practices at the household and 
community level that encourage conservation and responsible water use. In addition, the 
management practices that include larger infrastructure design and construction for the 
communities are sponsored at the state level; however they have to compete with each 
other for these systems. Interviewees indicated that they are actively involved in water 
management practices at the household and community level. As discussed in chapter 3, 
community members participate in elections for the comite de regantes and comite de 
agua potable which make the rules for community water use and are responsible for 
enforcement. As for construction of large-scale projects, the state representatives said that 
there were plans to improve water management, but discussions with community leaders 
revealed that thereis still room for improvement. 
4.3.3 Is governance appropriate to the local and regional context? 
Interviewees were asked about ways to improve water management in the 
community. They were asked what could be done now, to ensure water resources for the 
future. Responses incorporated suggestions that are pertinent to both the local and 
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regional context. Some suggestions can be applied locally, but many would require state 
support or funding (Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 Suggestions to Improve Water Management at the Local and 
Regional Level 
Suggestions and comments Total Responses % Total 
Communication/Education/Increase awareness 18 58 
Improve Infrastructure 14 45 
Collect garbage 8 26 
Implement technical irrigation and respect irrigation schedule 7 23 
Improve potable water 7 23 
Reforestation 7 23 
Conserve water resources and small streams 6 19 
Create plan or policy for environment and water resources 5 16 
Monitor Water 3 10 
Community is responsible for soliciting assistance 1 3 
Mayor is responsible for soliciting assistance 1 3 
    
Total Respondents 31  
 
Eighteen individuals — including government officials, community members, 
community leaders, and NGO representatives — said that communication, education, and 
increased awareness were the best ways to address water issues. Two community leaders 
and two NGO representatives confirmed enjoyable activities would improve 
participation. These community leaders from Recuayhuanca and Copa Grande said 
community residents are accustomed to having fun at reunions and a representative of 
Urpichallay explained that because campesinos work with their hands, active learning is 
essential.  
State officials discussed the need to make water meetings obligatory, “when 
meetings are not mandatory, campesinos don’t go”. Interviewees suggested that the 
mayor, community president, or another person of importance could ensure the presence 
of community members. In contrast, local NGO representatives said it was the meeting 
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topics that could attract participants. In general, government officials and some local 
leaders (dirigentes) suggested obligatory meetings, while other local leaders and NGO 
representatives said that meeting design was important in attracting participants. This 
dichotomy will be addressed in more detail in section 4.3.4 regarding users ability to play 
a role in monitoring activity and enforcing sanctions.  
 Fourteen interviewees stated that the best way to improve water management 
would be to improve infrastructure, specifically canals and reservoirs. All but one 
respondent was male and three respondents were located in the urban areas. Again, 
respondents distinguished between cement works and traditional designs. Of the total, 
nine respondents said that building cement canals and reservoirs were the best option. 
They paid particular attention to the collapse of traditional canal systems and said that 
cement construction was much sturdier and lasted longer. Cement-lined canals also allow 
water to flow faster, which may be a benefit, although this was not directly mentioned. In 
comparison, community leaders from Canrey Chico and three other informants from the 
district of Marcará prefer infrastructure improvements made in the local traditional style, 
with better materials and design because it has less impact on the environment. Canals 
and reservoirs can be made with rocks and other materials that allow water to filter into 
surrounding soils. In addition, they noted that if built well, unlined infrastructure can be 
as effective as cement-lined canals. One comunero from Vicos explained to me that 
cement canals do not let water percolate, killing any vegetation near the canal. This 
vegetation normally provides food for animals, so they must go elsewhere to eat. He said 
that unlined canals would allow wildlife to flourish near the infrastructure.  
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 It is important to consider canal and reservoir projects in both their local and 
regional context; many of the communities want cement canals and reservoirs because 
they say it will improve the local water management. However, the director of Huascaran 
National Park argues that at a regional level cement-lined infrastructure threatens the 
ecosystem of the park. As mentioned in chapter two, these two study areas, as well as 
many other campesino communities are located in the buffer or transition zone of the 
park. 
Eight interviewees mentioned garbage collection. These respondents were mostly 
male and represented communities within the study areas as well as Huaraz. There were 
two female respondents. One was a member of the comite de salud y social who said that 
garbage collection would help the health of the local community. The second woman, 
who worked in the tourism industry in Huaraz, said that garbage collection is necessary 
in order to attract tourists, but that tourists were also responsible for the increase in 
garbage. She explained that it is the responsibility of local guides to ensure that garbage 
is collected, but she did make the point that in many places even if garbage is collected, 
there is no place to put it. At a conference in Huaraz, discussions arose about local 
communities in the Callejón that had collected tourist garbage, but soon became 
overwhelmed with the amount of waste and realized that they could not continue to 
collect and store waste that was not from the community. Again, the dichotomy between 
local and regional context becomes important in the discussion of waste. The problem in 
the Callejón is the lack of designated dumping areas for communities and the lack of 
garbage collection available for these communities. Effective waste collection or 
dumping may require government assistance.  
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A local project proposed by seven interviewees includes technical irrigation and 
respecting the irrigation schedule to properly manage water. Four male community 
leaders said technical irrigation such as drip irrigation, sprinkler systems, and organic 
fertilizers or pesticides were important to improved management. Two additional male 
interviewees were engineers; one from the ALA and the second from a local NGO who 
said technical irrigation or conservation techniques is a good management strategy. One 
local female leader in Copa Grande noted the importance of respecting the irrigation 
schedule set up by the comite de regantes as good local management practice.  
Improving potable water, reforestation, and technical irrigation were each 
mentioned by seven interviewees as a strategy for improving water management. Those 
who referred to potable water improvements included three female and four male 
respondents, all from Marcará. Most were local leaders involved in the Club de Madres, 
health, and education. However, one urban resident and one rural community member 
said that improving potable water was important. In general, respondents noted the 
importance of cleaning, installing larger pipes and water tanks, properly treating water, 
and focusing on clean water for basic sanitation.  
In my interviews with potable water representatives, they each discussed the need 
to monitor households to ensure closed faucets. As previously noted, Purhuay/Aco 
Purhuay is the only community that imposes strict sanctions for not closing faucets. 
Individuals who receive three citations for open and running faucets will have their water 
turned off.  
Interviewees also mentioned reforestation as a way to conserve water and 
improve water management. These respondents included five men and two women. They 
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were local elected leaders, NGO representatives, or working in the tourism industry. Four 
interviewees stressed the importance of using native plants. These included two NGO 
representatives, one member of the comite de agua potable, and another member of the 
comite de regantes in the district of Marcará. In contrast, one interviewee said that 
planting a mixture of eucalyptus and pine would be the most beneficial because these 
trees can later be sold. The last two interviewees represented the National Park and the 
tourism industry and were not specific in the type of reforestation (either native or non-
native). However, native species preservation is important to the jobs of both individuals 
in promoting tourism. 
 In the Callejón, eucalyptus is used in many reforestation projects supported by 
the government. Not only are eucalyptus seedlings cheap, but sale of its wood is a source 
of income. That said, eucalyptus consumes a lot of water and may have negative impacts 
on soil quality, water resources, biodiversity, and local vegetation  (Betters and Laércio 
1995).  
Conservation techniques to maintain water resources, especially small streams 
were discussed by six interviewees, mostly male. They included four local dirigentes and 
one comunero in the District of Marcará. In addition, one woman representative from a 
local NGO and the director of PHN listed conservation techniques as good water 
management practice. Three informants alluded to the value of rain harvesting techniques 
and another three favored taking extra care of small streams. Many households 
throughout the study areas practice conservation. As noted earlier, many households store 
water in bins to ensure water availability if the tubes break or there is no available water.  
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In 2009, Urpichallay held workshops in the Community of Vicos to teach 
campesinos how to design and construct drip irrigation systems. In addition, one 
community leader in Olleros built a sprinkler system to irrigate his alfalfa fields. In 
addition to conserving water, a benefit of these projects is the cost. Sprinkler systems and 
drip irrigation can be relatively cheap, depending on the size and location of the farm.18 
As shown in the Olleros example, new irrigation technologies can be adopted by 
individuals and would be subject to local regulation. These projects are small in scale. 
They can be implemented at the user's discretion and installed piece by piece as funds 
become available. Drip and sprinkler irrigation on a small scale can be appropriate to the 
local context. However, there is opportunity to include regional leaders in helping 
implement these alternative irrigation systems. The Urpichallay workshops are geared 
toward more community-wide audiences, and the NGO has funds to help supply tools 
and equipment necessary to install these systems. 
Five respondents mentioned creating a plan or policy for water and the 
environment; four were male. Two were dirigentes from Recuayhuanca and Canrey 
Chico. The two dirigentes wanted to take care of the local environment and ensure that 
each sector within a community followed the rules. The ALA representative in Huaraz 
and the director of PNH also discussed the possibility of a plan. They wanted regional 
zoning and regulation and even higher payments for water. Yet, these measures require 
state support. A woman working in tourism wanted a plan to help increase the “value” of 
water so people would respect the resource more.   
                                                          
18 The representative from Olleros said the cost for his sprinkler system was approximately 20 dollars (60 
Nuevos Soles) to install the system himself. Drip irrigation systems can cost around 35 dollars or more, 
depending on the ground, plants, environment, and other characteristics of the farm. 
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Only three interviewees mentioned water monitoring, all of whom came from 
Marcará and Vicos. They sought increased monitoring by the local health agency or 
another entity. One Vicosino paid particular attention to mining contamination. 
Community members are currently addressing this problem; however, it may be that local 
efforts to control mining waste are not sufficient. As Urpichallay trains local volunteers 
to test water, communities are gaining technical ability and knowledge to determine what 
is in their water.  
The last two responses were each discussed by one informant. Each response 
highlights the dichotomy between campesinos and state officials over who should take 
responsibility for water management assistance. In this case, a local resident from 
Marcará said it was the Mayor’s responsibility to get help for the area, while the Mayor 
of Marcará, said it was the communities’ responsibility to ask for assistance. The 
responses reveal a gap in responsibility and an opportunity for cooperation. A community 
will be unsuccessful in soliciting assistance if the Mayor is unwilling to provide it, but a 
community might be hesitant to incorporate new government policies without previous 
consultation.  
4.3.4 What is the local ability to monitor activity and impose consequences? 
Water management systems in highland terrain are more difficult to monitor than 
in the coastal lowlands. There is little or no existing infrastructure to “scientifically” 
measure water use, according to western standards, which would be required for an 
effective private water management system. However, there is a current system of local 
supervision of water use by the comite de regantes and comite de agua potable. 
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Community members can also report violations to local leaders when appropriate. The 
community elects these leaders every year.  
Interviewees noted at various times during the interviews that awareness and 
education were crucial to improved water management. The nature of the responses is 
interesting to examine in more detail. The y-axis is the number of respondents suggesting 
the need for increased consciousness and education. The x-axis is the type of stakeholder 
needing increased consciousness and education. The classification into local leader, 
community member, NGO representative, or state official is located on the right. (Figure 
4.2). Respondents said that people could become more aware of the situation through 
education, workshops, community meeting, or charettes. In total, 30 individuals 
responded to the question “Who needs to be informed about the situation of water to take 
better care of it”?  
Most respondents said increasing awareness (sensibilización) and promoting 
education in the communities was the most important step in water management. A 
majority of these responses came from interviews with local leaders and NGO 
representatives, followed by state authorities. One NGO respondent said that someone 
who is knowledgeable about the situation should enter the community to discuss the 
situation. This suggests, that local community knowledge is not sufficient and an external 




Figure 4.2 Opinions of interviewees about who should be educated and more 
aware of the situation 
 
Increasing awareness and providing education to state officials was the second 
most popular response from interviewees. Twelve individuals said state leaders should be 
more aware of the situation. These included responses from state officials, NGO 
representatives, local leaders, and comuneros. Eight interviewees said to improve overall 
water management, everyone should be more aware of the situation of water resources. 
Most of these were local leaders who explained that it was important for everyone to 
know what is going on. They said that it was not enough just to educate and increase the 
awareness of state leaders or communities individually. Two local leaders from Vicos 
and Copa Grande said that communication with MINAG or engineers would help 
improve the situation.  
Only four individuals said that community leaders should be more aware of the 
situation. These included the community leaders themselves as well as comuneros. Three 
interviewees said that it was important to educate children and students. These three 
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individuals were dirigentes and comuneros who said that it was most important to start 
with the youth. They explained that youth were easier to educate than older individuals, 
who are set in their ways. Lastly, one informant in the tourism industry said that it was 
important to educate businesses and improve awareness of employees to promote better 
water management. Tourism is important to the local economy. According to tourism 
industry representatives, it is the responsibility of the guides to ensure that tourists respect 
the environment and water resources. Moreover, that visitors to the parks and 
communities do not interfere with water management or abuse the resource.  
While it was clear that most respondents would like to increase awareness and 
education of either campesinos or state officials, some respondents pitted one stratum of 
the population against another. For example, state officials argued that the campesino 
communities needed the education to make any real change to the treatment of water. 
Comuneros and community leaders said that the state government officials needed to be 
more aware of the water situation in order to be able to influence others. Two NGO 
representatives said that the best-case scenario would be to raise the awareness of both 
groups at the same time. One NGO representative also said that local civil servants 
should be considered in the education and awareness phases because they have more 
permanent posts and they can work with both municipalities and campesino communities. 
Concerns about water are not uniform among all interviewees. On one hand, when 
campesinos say that government officials need to more sensibilización, they are referring 
to service-related concerns such as garbage collection and storage. Campesinos are also 
concerned about potable water infrastructure and irrigation canals. They want state 
officials to be more aware about the local need for these projects. On the other hand, the 
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four government officials that said campesinos need to be more aware of the situation 
were concerned about the communities’ current ability to use and manage water 
appropriately. State officials want to teach campesinos to maximize the current services 
that already exist in the communities, rather than providing additional services to meet 
the needs.  
One last point that should be mentioned is the void in responsibility of local 
leaders as perceived by state officials and campesinos. Local community leadership 
positions such as the Presidente, comite de regantes, comite de agua potable, and more 
recently the comite de medio ambiente were all established by the national government. 
Technically, their legitimacy and power derives from the state. However, these leaders 
are community members and have strong ties to the community. Each campesino 
community is responsible for electing its leaders and may remove them if they are not 
fulfilling their duties. Community members generally respect these local leaders, and 
they have close contact with those individuals who elected them. There is a clear 
distinction, as seen from the community, between community members and their local 
leaders. In contrast, the state officials do not necessarily distinguish between campesino 
community leaders and the community as a whole. None of the government officials 
interviewed suggested for example, that community leaders should be more aware of the 
situation. This perceived gap in leadership is something to be aware of when discussing 
water governance. In addition, campesino community representatives in the Consejos de 
Cuenca will most likely be those with experience in a community leadership position.  
The failure of government officials to recognize the authority of local leaders can 
lead to difficult situations in monitoring and implementing sanctions. Local leaders must 
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establish rules within the legal limits set by the state. They are also responsible for 
decisions and imposing sanctions or fines. As water management takes on a regional 
character, confidence in local leaders is crucial.  
Few individuals discussed sanctions in the interviews, in part because very few 
communities actually imposed them. All communities have a system to impose monetary 
fines, and it appears that the threat of monetary sanctions is enough to deter abuse.  
Purhuay/Aco Purhuay was the only community in the study areas that imposed 
strict sanctions. Representatives from the comite de regantes and comite de agua potable 
in this community told me that they were very strict about sanctions and would cut off 
water to the abusers if necessary. However, they said that because the community has 
seen consequences imposed, it is a good strategy to deter additional abuse. Water is still 
abundant in the Cordillera Blanca, but the threat of monetary fines or social exclusion is 
usually enough to deter serious water violations. However, as water supply continues to 
decrease, especially during the dry season, these communities may need to impose more 
strict sanctions on water abusers. In this event, Cordillera Negra communities may be 
able to help Cordillera Blanca communities to learn how to best exercise their authority 
to impose sanctions. This strategy could be beneficial to both parties. Campesinos can 
have access to water saving irrigation techniques, which might ensure reliable water 
resources. At the same time, regional leaders can be more assured that campesino 
communities are using water wisely, something that state authorities seem to disagree on.  
If the state determines conservation techniques are a new priority, large-scale 
efforts to conserve water will be supported by the state and techniques imposed on local 
communities. Discussions between community leaders and state representatives should 
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occur before decisions are made or techniques are determined, as many households 
already maintain some type of practice. In this case, it might be more feasible for the 
government to piggyback on conservation projects already in place, rather than overhaul 
local projects to implement state sponsored measures. For this local monitoring to be 
successful, the state needs to support the findings and decisions made by the community. 
If there is no state support, it will be more difficult for communities to regulate mining 
waste and ensure safe drinking water for the local populations. 
The depth and detail of my interviews was crucial in examining local water 
management practice, problems they face, participation in management and governance, 
appropriate fit to comuneros and government officials, and local rules and regulations. 
Campesino communities face significant challenges to water management. These 
challenges exist at both the local and regional level. My research shows that campesino 
community management in the two districts meets the conditions set up by Ostrom 
(1990) for successfully managing common property resources. However, they now face a 
series of new threats to water supply and demand coupled with new regional management 
that might not be participatory in practice. If there is no representation of the local voice, 
it will be increasingly difficult for communities to maintain their local water management 
and meet local needs.  
The following section will review national water policy and how it may be 
applied in practice at the local level. As IWRM is currently not operational, we can look 
at bureaucratic tendencies and recent events that may provide insight into how campesino 




 WATER REGIMES AND CAMPESINO COMMUNITIES 
Prior to the 1969 General Water Law (Ley General de Aguas), passed by the 
military government of Velasco, highland communities had local irrigation systems 
(Palerm-Viquiera 2008). These systems were based upon traditional uses (usos y 
costumbres) that have been in practice in Andean agriculture for many years. Changes in 
local water management reflected fluctuating water volume or other shifts in local needs 
and priorities. Changes to national water management reflected the dynamic needs of the 
country. For example, the new 2009 water law values integrated management that 
incorporates different agencies under the national water authority (ANA). Yet, to meet 
the local needs embedded in the integrated system, special attention needs to be given to 
participatory decision-making (Gleick et al. 2002). However, national policies favor 
powerful international enterprises sometimes at the expense of local marginalized 
communities.  
Peru’s water laws have been established to identify important uses and provide 
legislative support for those uses. In the past, different aspects of water management had 
been delegated to various agencies that did not always make consistent decisions or 
regulations. With heightened concerns about water availability, the national government 
has implemented an integrated approach to streamline the decision-making process by 
creating the ANA. Section one of this chapter will examine the four framework 
characteristics through the old 1969 and new 2009 water laws. Section describes 
institutional reforms. The agrarian reform opened possibilities for campesino 
participation, yet since the 1990’s, many policies have been put in place that marginalize 
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highland campesinos. The third section examines the policies created by the national 
government and how they impact campesino communities and their livelihood. The 
fourth section considers Andean water rights and the situation of the campesino 
communities within Peruvian water regimes. 
5.1 The Old and New Water Laws in Peru  
The old water law (Ley General de Aguas No 17752) was passed in 1969 under 
the military dictatorship of General Juan Velasco Alvarado. The water law defined 
appropriate uses of water as those consistent with social benefits and development of the 
nation. This law accompanied large-scale nationalization projects and an Agrarian 
Reform that expropriated large haciendas and gave indigenous and campesino 
communities land rights. Peru’s new water law (Ley de Recursos Hídricos No 29338) 
passed in March 2009, implemented new changes that may significantly alter the way 
water is managed throughout the country. Although this policy was adopted with a 76 to 
0 vote, this new law has raised important questions about how the rural highland 
populations, many with their own community-based systems of water management, will 
deal with these legislative changes. 
5.1.1 How is water valued? 
 The 1969 water law established water as property of the state and designated state 
responsibilities to include the following:  
• formulating laws for utilization and development,  
• planning and administration of its uses,  
• evaluation of potential uses,  
• conservation and preservation of water resources,  
• performing research and maintaining current information related to the 




While section three of the law specified that water use promote social benefits and 
development of the nation. Water needs were prioritized as  
1. Primary needs and water supply to the population; 
2. Raising and production of animals; 
3. Agriculture; 
4. Energy, industrial, and mining use; 
5. Other. 
In 2009, the new law made a significant change to how water is viewed. The new 
law recognizes social, cultural, economic, and environmental value of water, and calls for 
integrated management and equilibrium between the different values (Article 1). The law 
also calls for the creation of mechanisms that allow participation by water users in the 
decision-making process. In addition, it should provide assistance to organizations of 
water users and support for education and knowledge sharing.  
Similar to the 1969 law, the 2009 Ley de Recursos Hídricos prioritizes water uses; 
however, the new law defines in greater detail the priorities. The new law also prioritized 
a series of productive uses. These new priorities are official and in order of importance. 
At the Lima Roundtable, representatives from the mining industry said it should be listed 








Table 5.1 Old Water Law and New Water Law 
Prioritized Uses 
 Rank 2009 Ley de Recursos Hídricos (Article 43) 1969 Ley General de Aguas 
1 Primary Use: 
Satisfy basic human needs such as cooking, direct 
consumption, personal hygiene, ceremonial, cultural, 
religious, and ritual use. 
Primary Needs 
2 Public Use: 
Capture of water for a public water source or for public 
infrastructure that should be treated and serve basic 
human needs. 
Animals 
3 Productive use: 
Used in the process of production in any capacity. 
Productive use includes (in order): 
a.     Agriculture  
b.     Fishing 
c.     Energy 
d.     Industrial 
e.     Medicinal 
f.      Mining 
g.     Recreation 
h.     Tourism 
i.      Transportation 
Agriculture 
4  Energy and Mining 
5  Other 
 
Objectives of the new water management system are to coordinate and ensure 
integrated and multi-sectoral management, sustainable and efficient use, and conservation 
of the resource. Changes were also made in the way the legal system treats water: it is 
now recognized as a renewable resource and water quality is now included in the law. 
5.1.2 Is decision-making participatory? 
In the 1969 law, water management responsibilities were distributed among 
different state agencies including the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), Ministry of 
Health (MINSA), and later the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MINEM). Each agency 
had different goals, values, standards, and applications to meet their responsibilities to 
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manage and control water resources and use. This complicated management to the point 
where some regulations overlapped or were enforced according to contradicting 
standards19.  
 In response to the overlapping jurisdiction and heightened water concerns, the 
national government pushed for the new 2009 water law that incorporated integrated 
management and emphasized water basin governance. The new law brought special focus 
on modernizing water and its use in agriculture, mining, daily and household use towards 
more rational behavior to better secure water availability in the future.  
In my interviews, local water authority (ALA) representatives praised the new law 
and establishment of the ANA for creating mechanisms of integrated management, 
addressing issues of water quality, and creating an education component. Representatives 
said that this new law will significantly improve the way water is managed throughout 
the country and that it will recognize the importance of traditional water use by 
indigenous and campesino communities. Although the legislation includes users 
(usuarios) such as campesino communities into the decision-making arena, local NGOs 
that work closely with communities speculated about how this will happen. They 
explained that the law only calls for participation but does not create mechanisms to 
enforce participation.20 It is worth noting that the new law calls for development of an 
education curriculum as well as plans to prevent and adapt to climate change effects on 
                                                          
19 An example of this is that the Ministry of Health was the only agency concerned with or playing a major 
role in water quality. The Ministry of Energy and Mining only had to deal with water quality when 
performing the environmental impact analysis, but did not seem to adequately handle concerns of water 
quality after the initial analysis was complete. There are many examples of a community’s frustration with 
the Ministry of Energy and Mining after their water sources were contaminated by mining operations 
(Trawick 2003; Boelens and Gelles 2005). 
20 These comments are based on two interviews with ALA representatives in Huaraz and Caraz as well as 
conversations with engineers from the NGO Urpichallay.  
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the local, regional, and national scale. It is not clear how the education component will 
become operational as of yet.  
In the 2009 law, Article 25 states local and regional governments are to create 
resource management plans for their respective watersheds, participate in the watershed 
council, and develop methods to monitor and control water to guarantee a sustainable 
supply. However, the most important aspect for campesino water rights is the recognition 
of the right of campesino communities and indigenous populations to organize to manage 
their springs and micro watersheds in coordination with their usos y costumbres. The law 
states that, “Traditional organizations of these communities have the same rights as the 
user organizations” (Article 32).21Although many are suspicious of this article, this new 
recognition may prove powerful when entering a legal battle with an external actor. 
5.1.3 Is governance appropriate to the local and regional context? 
In addition to MINAG and MINSA responsible for water management, the 1969 
water law gave responsibilities to the Junta de Usuarios (organization of water users). 
The Junta de Usuarios de Distrito de Riego official post is at the district level. The Junta 
assisted the regional water authority and regional agriculture officials to create a plan for 
cultivation and irrigation considering the hydrologic realities in the area. These priorities 
as part of MINAG goals were important to meet and explicitly explained (Article 45). 
The 2009 water law created two institutions, the National Water Authority 
(Autoridad Nacional de Aguas, ANA) under MINAG and Regional Watershed Councils 
                                                          
21 Author’s translation 
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(Consejo de Recursos Hídricos de Cuenca), one for each region. This new integrated 
system of water management has a vertical hierarchy with seven levels of actors.22 
1. National Water Authority (ANA) 
2. Ministers of Environment; Agriculture; Housing, Construction and Sanitation; 
health; and energy and mining; 
3. Regional governments and local government; 
4. Agricultural and non agricultural organizations; 
5. Hydropower sector operators; 
6. Campesino and indigenous communities; 
7. Public entities linked to water resource management.23 
IWRM in principle, links the national actors with the local officials, representing the top-
down and bottom-up management. However, even in the new law, it is not clear how this 
will be successfully implemented.  
5.1.4 Is it possible to monitor use and impose consequences? 
The 1969 law established irrigation districts. Users in each district was assigned 
fixed fees for each unit of the water used. Fees were intended to cover the costs of 
collecting and distributing water, to help finance studies, and to develop local water 
infrastructure (Article 12). Under this law, primary functions of the water authority 
(Autoridad de Aguas), housed in the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), included 
applying methods that reduced water loss, ensured maximum availability, and most 
efficient use of the resource (Article 19).  
The 2009 law establishes the rights of user organizations (WUAS), which are the 
lowest tier of water governance. WUAS are integrated into the juntas de usuarios or user 
groups. The law lays out the following functions for the junta: operate and maintain water 
infrastructure, distribute water, and collect and administer water fees (Article 28). 
                                                          
22 This changed the structure of the water authority established in 1969. The new water authority is 
structured with the National Water Authority (ANA), Regional Water Authority (AAA), and Local Water 




5.2 Institutional Reform 
The power dynamics between campesinos and external actors have changed 
significantly and become increasingly polarized. Today there is more pressure on the 
government for export oriented goods and increased production of mining activity and 
hydropower. Campesinos fear the implications on their livelihood. This section will 
review some of the major institutional changes that came about through various national 
governments and political leaders who undertook major reforms and political changes. 
The first is the Velasco government, which undertook Agrarian Reform and pushed 
large-scale nationalizations throughout Peru. Second, the political environment of the 
1980’s resulted in significant internal struggles in the country. This led to strong political 
reform changes by the Fujimori Government in the 1990’s. These policies are continued 
today.  
5.2.1 Political and Historical Context 
In 1969, General Juan Velasco Alvarado enacted Agrarian Reform (Law 1776). 
Agrarian reform expropriated roughly 15,000 properties, over 8 million hectares, which 
represented about 45% of agricultural land (Albertus 2010). However, according to 
Albertus,  
“Although the reform left out key sectors of the rural poor, many peasants 
were materially benefitted, and it drastically changed land tenure relations 
in Peru” (2010, 3)  
 
Agrarian reform also helped establish an official recognition of campesino 
communities and established a policy of titling property rights to campesinos. In 1971, 
Velasco created the Nationalization System of Support of Social Mobilization (Sistema 
Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social, SINAMOS) to deal with social problems. 
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SINAMOS worked with the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) and Peruvian 
Peasant Confederation (CCP) to help push forward the policies of agrarian reform.24 In 
the short-term agrarian reform helped establish egalitarian principles promoting 
“revolution” and “reform from above”. However, in the long term, according to 
Manrique (1996) “the haciendas had disappeared, but the cooperatives retained the 
structure of the latifundios”. In 1970, the Decree Law of Agrarian Reform (Decreto Ley 
N 17716) included twelve articles that established legal peasant communities and granted 
collective rights to govern land as Peruvian citizens (Minority Rights Group International 
2007). Rural campesinos were no longer considered colonos or peons.  
In 1983, Peru experienced a financial crisis. According to Klarén (1992), in the 
highlands, infant mortality increased significantly, life expectancy dropped, malnutrition 
was serious, and underemployment and unemployment plagued the countryside. Klarén 
(1992) contends that these social and economic conditions resulted in the emergence of 
the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in 1980.  
In 1985, Alan Garcia Perez was elected President. Garcia’s presidency was 
plagued by political, social, and economic instability and by expansion of terrorist 
activities by Sendero Luminoso and Movimiento Revolucionario de Tupac Amaru 
(MRTA or Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). This led to the election of Alberto 
Fujimori in 1990. Fujimori, with assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank, implemented structural adjustment policies. These policies known as 
“Fuji-shock”, left twice as many Peruvians in poverty (Jochnick 1997). Fujimori 
                                                          
24 The CNA became the new face of what was once the hacendados association (National Agrarian Society 




promoted large-scale privatization, dismantled barriers to foreign investment, and 
focused on export industries. Bury (2005) found that there was significant economic 
change from 1994-2001. During this time, foreign direct investment (FDI) more than 
doubled, government income increased significantly and total exports and net foreign 
reserves grew. However, with growing allegations of fraud and corruption in Fujimori’s 
administration, the party lost control of congress and Fujimori resigned.  
In 2001, Alejandro Toledo beat Alan Garcia in the election and was president 
until 2006. In 2006, new elections led Alan Garcia into his second term as president. 
During his second term, Alan Garcia has taken a much different approach to Peru’s 
development than the first term. García replicated and further extended the policies set up 
by Fujimori and Toledo. Alan Garcia signed the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the 
United States in 2007, promising to, “maximize exploitation of Peru's rich mining, 
hydrocarbon, forestry and fishing resources on the basis of agreements that attract inward 
investment” (Oxford Analytica 2009).  
Overt opposition to these policies, which facilitated the taking and exploitation of 
natural resources, came to the forefront of the nation’s agenda in 2009, with violent 
conflicts in the Bagua province (Amazonas). Critics of the policies suggested that a series 
of Legislative Decrees coupled with the FTA would allow for even more rapid depletion 
of natural resources in environmentally sensitive areas, especially where rural campesino 
or indigenous communities live. They were angry about not having any representation in 
the process. The Bagua conflict was a serious blow to the national policies that favored 




5.3 Extractive industries policy in Peru  
The term “accumulation by dispossession” has been used to describe Peruvian 
natural resource policy (Bebbington et al. 2008). Harvey (2003, 145) argues that “what 
accumulation by dispossession does is to release a set of assets (including labour power) 
at a very low (and in some instances zero) cost” through privatization and 
commoditization of common property resources. The potential for water takings is high. 
In the Callejón as well as the rest of the country, the government takes resources through 
a process of eminent domain, justified for the good of the population. This practice is 
encouraged by international companies (i.e. mining and export agricultural producers).  
The nature of President Alan García’s policies on extraction is evidenced by two 
op-ed pieces published in the Peruvian newspaper, El Comercio (Garcia 2007a; 2007b). 
The most contentious article written by García, “El sindrome del perro del hortelano”, 
created great debate because of its symbolism and context.25 He used examples of 
abundant water resources that could be used for hydroelectricity, millions of hectares of 
trees that could be harvested, hundreds of mineral deposits, and ocean resources that are 
not tapped and will not be tapped by the indigenous populations and rural campesinos 
sitting idle on them (Garcia 2007a). 
Extractive industries are energy intensive and typically located in the extreme 
periphery. Bunker (1985) argues that multiple inequalities are produced in the transfer of 
raw materials from the periphery to the core. Full benefits are realized at the core and 
non-renewable resource loss occurs in the periphery (i.e. rural highland areas). Similarly, 
                                                          
25 He used the metaphor of the garners dog from the works of Lope de Vega (1618). The gardener’s dog 
does not eat the vegetables out of the garden, nor allow anyone else to eat from it. García portrayed the 




Martin Scurrah examined conflicts between extractive industries and indigenous 
populations. The conflicts centered on “competition for natural resources, that includes 
land, water, and air…” (Scurrah 2008, 304). Water quality is an important factor in 
conflicts due to use and pollution by extractive industries. Toxic effluents can impact the 
water supply of indigenous communities located within close proximity of a site. 26 
Another type of conflict involves “not respecting dignity of citizens, which 
includes civil and political rights, right to free and informed previous consent, and right 
to development” (Scurrah 2008, 304). The first component is the right to free and 
informed consent, which is commonly a problem. This right, Scurrah finds, is often 
ignored because the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) has the legitimate authority 
to make water-related decisions. However, it is these adjacent communities that will incur 
the cost of extraction. Scurrah claims that “although Peru is a democracy, it still has the 
institutions and mechanisms based on an autocratic and vertical state, not a democratic or 
participatory one” (Scurrah 2008, 310). He notes there are some participatory 
mechanisms that exist within the state but they are very rarely used ― and only when 
necessary. Historically, the extractive industries profited and the central government 
benefited from this wealth without supporting the local communities adjacent to these 
productive industries. Scurrah (2008) notes these industries created enclaves that did not 
support development, reduce poverty, or enhance the quality of life in these adjacent 
communities. That said, some industries have taken on the role of social development. 
                                                          
26 Additional issues specifically related to petroleum and gas, there are conflicts over subsurface rights. In 
Peru, as in other Latin American countries, private land tenure is only applicable to surface land. 
Subsurface rights belong to the state. This fact becomes very important for extractive industries and 
individuals that have a stake or interest in land with valuable resources underneath. 
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Antamina, for example, claims to have invested 124 million dollars in programs 
promoting health, education, and institutional strengthening (Bhp Billiton 2010). 
In sum, the use and depletion of these resources has significantly inhibited rural 
development (Bunker 1985; Scurrah 2008; Bebbington et al. 2008). In response, 
communities across Peru have resisted government policies and can be described as, 
“defense of livelihood, in which movements emerge to protect assets by challenging the 
structures, discourses and institutions that drive and permit exploitation and 
dispossession” (Bebbington et al. 2008, 2890). These tensions are reflected in water 
management debates in the Callejón. For example, according to the director of Parque 
Nacional Huascaran, representatives from the Chavimochic irrigation project are in talks 
with the Park to ensure reliable access to freshwater resources where communities 
struggle to ensure highland availability.  
5.4 Campesino Communities and the Peruvian water regime 
References to Andean water rights and local user collectives in the 2009 Water 
law raise questions about the integrated system. In particular, how local management will 
handle the increasingly difficult conflicts from internal and external forces. Boelens 
argues that the relationship between water rights and power structure is two-sided: 
“power relations generate key features of water rights’ contents, distribution and 
legitimacy and, in turn, water rights in action reproduce or restructure power relations” 
(2008, 50). Water struggles are embedded in communal relations, yet also encompass 
supralocal agents such as government agencies, mining corporations, and energy 
companies that unquestionably have more power and control over the decision-making 
process at the regional and national scale.  
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On one hand, campesino community control of water reflects the legitimacy of 
local water rights and ability to exercise these rights. In these collective user systems, 
water rights define access to the resource and physical infrastructure as well as the 
decision making process (Boelens 2008). Boelens and Zwarteveen (2005) distinguish 
three dimensions of water rights: “socio-legal, technical and organizational”. All three are 
required for effective water management. The socio-legal dimension refers to the 
legitimacy of a water right holder and must be recognized by those within the system as 
well as by individuals excluded from use. Second, the technical ability to access water is 
another factor that must also be present for water rights to be exercised. Third, the 
organizational dimension includes management of the infrastructure and allocation 
decisions. In the Andes, most irrigation systems are governed by community-based 
organizations. Boelens (2008) argues that for these local systems to survive, communities 
must succeed in collectively managing and reducing risks and conflicts. This may lead 
them to request state assistance (Trawick 2001). Communities have been successful in 
using state assistance; however, at the same time they are relying on a government that 
systematically disenfranchises them.  
Peruvian agencies claim to benefit highland communities, but overall their actions 
tend to serve the interests of national and international power holders. Boelens and Gelles 
(2005) argue that neoliberal policies favoring decentralization and privatization transfer 
responsibility to the local and regional governments, but maintain the central decision 
making body in the Capital. Central water policies define the rules for allocation, use, 
maintenance, and infrastructure development. Boelens and Zwarteveen (2005) criticize 
these policies for not taking into account the realities that do not fit policy prescriptions. 
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They argue against the neoliberal assumption that successful water markets leads to 
security of water resources for beneficiaries (Boelens and Zwarteveen 2005).  
Boelens and Zwarteveen (2005) writing about Peru’s 1969 water law and the 
proposed law, criticized national decision making bodies for not recognizing the “existing 
diversity and dynamic water rights and distribution practices” (2005, 743). Boelens and 
Gelles (2005) argue that the state tends to ignore indigenous models of water 
management and favors modern techniques, infrastructure, and organization. The 2009 
water law specifically addresses the right of the campesino and indigenous communities 
to use water in accordance to their usos y costumbres, but it is not clear how this law will 
play out in the future, given the tendency of the Peruvian state to serve the needs of the 
national and international enterprises. Many communities do take action to address the 
threats to their traditional management. According to Boelens and Zwarteveen,  
“Many existing water rights communities do not silently accept usurpation 
by states and markets, but resist and fight against water reform proposals. 
These struggles are expressions of fear for the destruction of existing 
livelihoods, local domains of agricultural production and identity. As such 
they challenge the new water resource distribution, the new water rules, 
and the new water language and discourse” (Boelens and Zwarteveen 
2005, 739).  
 
Increasing concerns about privatization and encroachment by extractive 
enterprises on communities’ water supplies are fueling numerous protests. Bebbington et 
al. (2008) argue that these movements can be understood as responses to threats to 
campesino livelihoods. The Bagua conflict and other protests are expressions of 
campesino and indigenous communities’ fears of water privatization and changes in local 
traditional water management (Páez 2009). In the case of water, it is a way to maintain 
local water management. Accounts reported in the Peruvian Times describe recent 
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opposition to the new water law sponsored by the national organization of irrigation 
districts (Peruvian Times 2009). Protests and roadblocks are expressions of campesino 
and indigenous communities’ fears of water privatization and changes in local water 
management. This suggests the articles in the Ley de Recursos Hídricos that encourage 
campesino participation and respect for their traditional systems are symbolic, and will 
not be enforced. Bureaucratic procedures and nuances of the law have been used to 
undermine indigenous rights while protecting others. The Peruvian state employs 
neoliberal policies, according to Boelens and Gelles, to “pretend to provide universal 
benefits — while in fact extend state control and the cultural orientations of national and 
international power holders” (Boelens and Gelles 2005, 316). The authors argue that the 
neoliberal policies imposed on the Andean region are internalized by communities and 
change their water management systems accordingly. It appears that the success of the 
campesino communities to continue local water management are linked to their ability to 
internalize these bureaucratic changes. Trawick (2001) found that the local state water 
administrators had little presence in the villages he studied (and probably many other 
villages in the rural Andean region). These bureaucratic agencies have had little influence 
in the way water is managed and people are left to their own traditional systems to 
manage water. The new law calls for the creation of a national and regional body to 
manage watersheds, participation by local water groups, and inclusion of usos y 
costumbres in water policies. However, experience shows that the state supports the 
national and international powers that continue to marginalize the campesino and 
indigenous populations.  
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The Bagua example has shown that local communities can successfully resist the 
takings of resources. However, this success does not mean they will gain representation. 
As problems become more severe and competition for water resources become more 
intense, how can communities continue to effectively resist the capture of water? A 
solution may be to ensure representation of these users, which might help reduce the 
opposition and the need for communities to fight back. The national government has 
recently established a participatory space for campesino communities regarding 
management of water resources through the Consejo de Cuenca. The question is whether 





A series of threats face water supply, demand, and quality in the Callejón de 
Huaylas. With glacial retreat, highland areas throughout the Andes are projected to 
experience severe water shortage by 2050. At the same time, expansion of the 
“agricultural frontier” and the growth of Peru’s coastal population is increasing water 
demand. This success of the coastal economy depends on the freshwater availability from 
the Andes.  
State policies tend to support the export-oriented enterprises and extractive 
industries. These policies and regulations may threaten highland systems either by 
limiting access to water or by giving preferential treatment to external actors such as 
mining companies or large coastal irrigation projects. Campesino communities are 
important to national food security. Campesinos maintain the large biodiversity of 
potatoes and other tubers grown in highland areas. The International Potato Center has 
collected more than 5,000 varieties of potatoes in Peru. Although the state systematically 
disenfranchises campesino communities, they have maintained strong networks and 
reciprocal relationships that are important characteristics of their local culture and 
traditions.  
In this thesis, I argued that four characteristics are key to effective water 
management: 1) appropriately valuing water 2) participatory decision-making, 3) water 
management appropriate to the local and regional context, and 4) ability to monitor water 
use and apply consequences. An analysis of existing local systems and integrated systems 
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showed that although each met the four characteristics to some degree, they each present 
challenges related to scale. Local systems are not able to effectively scale up to meet the 
needs of the larger regional or watershed context, while in theory integrated systems face 
significant challenges to participatory decision-making and scaling down management. 
We have seen evidence of successful water management systems in Switzerland and 
effective watershed councils created in Brazil. These examples relied heavily on the 
ability of the local communities to effectively represent their position to higher 
government officials. In Brazil for example, this was done through the creation of 
participatory decision-making space, and assistance of institutional organizations to help 
reduce information asymmetry, network expansion, and creation of umbrella 
organizations to help local communities incorporate a regional watershed frame. The 
Swiss example relied on participatory decision-making, low information asymmetry, and 
a balance between individual and communal property.  
In 2009, Peruvian new water law focuses on achieving integrated management by 
creating an independent water authority, theoretically raising the priority of water 
governance.  ANA and its subsidiaries at the local, regional, and watershed level are 
supposed to have a participatory element. The Consejo de Cuenca includes representation 
of all user groups in a given watershed, but representation is no guarantee of power. 
Moreover, no policy or mechanism is in place to ensure all water users are adequately 
represented in this watershed advisory council. .Communities will need to reorganize 
themselves to better represent their position within the Consejo de Cuenca. The lack of 
mechanisms for participatory decision-making, coupled with the increasing coastal 
demands for water resources, threatens local management systems and campesino 
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communities’ ability to effectively meet the needs of the local population. The increasing 
need for water in coastal areas competes significantly with highland irrigation.  
Interviews with state officials, local community leaders, community members, 
and NGO representatives provided a detailed description of the current situation and 
future needs of the area. I found that the four characteristics essential for successful 
common-property water management were generally met within the context of local 
management in the Callejón; however communities face the problem of scaling up to 
engage in the regional decision-making process. Results showed that the problem with 
water was valued differently among water users in the area, although most individuals 
used water for irrigation and domestic use. Furthermore, local management systems are 
participatory, and there are opportunities for community members to participate in the 
water management system and in water management writ large through water 
conservation at the household level.  
The ability to scale up to the regional level is important to local and integrated 
management. This suggests the integrated system must scale down to meet local needs 
while local management must consider the watershed as a unit. If issues that are a 
concern to both parties can be addressed, it may pave the way for more effectively 
dealing with the difficult management issues. My research shows that campesino 
communities are not currently involved in the regional or watershed decision-making 
process, which may threaten their ability to maintain local water management practices. 
Furthermore, as evidenced by the Brazil case, the potential for campesino communities to 
effectively engage in the larger decision-making body can increase if institutions or 
agencies are available to help foster this transition. In the case of the Callejón, the efforts 
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of local NGOs may help achieve local actors to work at the regional level. Specifically, 
Asociación Urpichallay and The Mountain Institute provide technical support and 
information dissemination. In addition, they work to build the capacity of these 
communities to employ water-monitoring techniques and other community based 
activities such as technical irrigation projects and community strategic planning. If the 
overlap in needs and desires between campesino communities and regional officials can 
be addressed, there may be increasing potential for communication and collaboration 
between the two levels of governance.  
6.1 Opportunities and Challenges 
The main issue addressed in this thesis is the ability of campesino communities to 
scale up and meet representatives at the regional or watershed decision-making table. 
Interviews in the Callejón revealed various needs that individuals would like to see 
happen in the future for improved management. There are great opportunities and 
challenges to addressing these needs. The first is the need to create institutions capable of 
addressing issues that are of regional concern. Some practices require a change in focus 
(i.e., local to regional or regional to local) while others have potential for collaborative 
efforts between local and regional management. Based on my assessment of current local 
and regional events and interview responses, there is a need to create institutions capable 
of addressing issues that are of regional concern. The consequences of climate change for 
example are projected to have a significant impact on individuals living in the Andean 
Region. Moreover, in the case of Peru, these consequences will also impact coastal 
communities that depend on Andean freshwater. 
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The problem is that no institutions currently exist, but problems are regional in 
scale. In addition to climate change, other problems mentioned to me during interviews 
were large-scale needs such as solid waste collection and construction of irrigation 
canals.  
Large-scale needs such as solid waste collection and storage may require 
assistance from the regional governments or watershed councils. These projects may 
require the technical engineering and expertise necessary to comply compliance with 
state regulation. If these projects are to span a large distance or incorporate various 
communities or areas, state assistance may also be necessary. However, it may also be 
relevant to ask if communities take on some of these management roles, such as garbage 
collection and storage, what state officials can offer in return. The state-local relationship 
can become more reciprocal in that campesino communities accept additional 
responsibility to manage their own waste effectively in exchange for state support for 
other projects.  
Construction of reservoirs and glacial lake engineering is another issue causing 
great debate. Reservoirs and controlled releases from glacial lakes have mitigated risk of 
some natural disasters; yet leave a large environmental impact. Any new construction of 
these projects should address environmental risk. Many communities desire reservoirs as 
stable water storage, however including local participation in this decision-making 
process might prove difficult. The environmental impact and intense construction (i.e., 
capital and labor), may require communities to share a reservoir. To better understand 
this need, an understanding of the watershed will be critical. Although, when trying to 
consider the watershed as the unit of measure, some individuals may be more inclined to 
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work with outside communities and some may stick with the status quo. Large-scale 
projects will require creative thinking at the local and regional level. The idea of a 
“collective watershed identity” is pivotal to successfully implement these projects with 
support from local communities and regional officials.  
Still, efforts to develop appropriate institutions are critical and need to have local 
support. Currently, there are networking efforts among local NGOs and some 
communities, yet these groups face significant challenges to creating an institution that 
can effectively tackle regional problems. Even if strong institutions existed, campesinos 
members would face fundamental challenges. One challenge is the need for face to face 
communication. Campesino community traditions in building and maintaining 
relationship based on proximity may prove difficult in communicating and aligning with 
other communities out of reach. Second, logistical issues can also be decisive. Travel is 
expensive and can be prohibitive for some individuals. Moreover, time spent in these 
meetings is time spent away from the fields, which some individuals may not be able to 
afford.  
There are two projects that were mentioned as a priority on both the local and 
regional level, which may provide an opportunity for early collaboration between local 
and regional levels. These opportunities include reforestation and conservation projects 
that are currently on the radar of both local communities and regional officials as 
strategies to improve water management. Comuneros, dirigentes, and state 
representatives mentioned reforestation projects to improve water management. In this 
light, reforestation may be easier, compared other projects, to coordinate efforts between 
local and regional management activities. Recalling the Brazil case, where small efforts 
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to tackle a problem as a unified group built confidence, reforestation projects may present 
a similar opportunity. This may be an early project to begin as it will incorporate local 
and regional plans for reforestation and allow local communities to participate in the 
decision-making process and the activity itself, helping create additional buy-in.  
Conservation projects were another issue mentioned by many interviewees. Most 
with were familiar with the severe water problems in the Callejón and emphasized the 
importance of water conservation. Despite the fact many individuals mentioned 
conservation, the range of techniques varied significantly to include large-scale efforts 
and individual or household strategies. Collaborative efforts at the local and regional 
levels should present themselves as local and regional officials come to the same 
decision-making table. Again, addressing the question of reciprocity, if local 
communities make a significant effort to conserve water at the local level, what can the 
regional officials provide in return? Discussing these issues in the light of reciprocity 
may ensure that each group holds up its end of the deal. Reciprocal relations can be a 
powerful social tool in the Andes. It also can help enforce the decisions made, encourage 
participation, and provide more weight to promises made in both the local and regional 
arena.  
There are both opportunities for and barriers to a collaborative relationship 
between local and state officials as well as the opportunities and challenges for local 
officials to participate in regional decision-making. First, establishing and strengthening 
networks of NGOs or other institutional entities such as the university can help local 
communities to scale up to the regional level. These entities can encourage 
communication and reduce the technical language barriers between the two levels of 
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governance. Establishing stronger relationships with National Park Huascarán and 
tourism agencies is another route to consider. As sustainable tourism in becoming 
popular in the area, creating and strengthening relationships with these agencies can 
prove beneficial. In particular, issues of solid waste and reforestation can be addressed, as 
there are concerns about these two issues in both the local and regional context.  
The barriers to local management scaling up to the regional watershed level are 
numerous. The large discrepancy in problem framing and proposed solutions shows that 
individuals in the Callejón do not take these issues lightly. In addition, the divergent 
needs of economies in the highlands and coast are also concerns as are internal barriers 
like gender and language.  
There was discrepancy among the opinions of interviewees on two major issues, 
education and increased awareness and cement or traditional infrastructure development. 
Comuneros said local dirigentes and regional leaders should be educated, while local 
dirigentes said comuneros and regional leaders need to be education, and regional 
officials said the communities need to be educated. In addition, there were different 
views about who should be educated first, and which individuals had the responsibility to 
educate the population.  
The Santa watershed encompasses both coastal cities and large irrigation schemes 
that rely heavily on Andean water and highland campesino communities. Highland 
communities compete with coastal societies for representation. In addition, most highland 
campesinos speak Quechua as their first language, which may pose difficulties at the 
decision-making table. Campesinos must address this issue by selecting representatives 
who can effectively communicate with their Spanish-speaking counterparts. Furthermore, 
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technical and engineering terms may be difficult for all parties to understand. The use of 
umbrella organizations to help facilitate these discussions might prove beneficial for 
communication between the local representation and the regional officials.  
6.2 Future Outlook 
Despite the mounting problems facing campesino communities, local systems are 
currently able to meet needs. However might not be sustainable for a long period of time. 
There are opportunities available to work with other communities and external actors for 
improved water management. The ideal situation for campesino communities is to 
position themselves within the watershed decision-making body to adequately represent 
local needs within the larger context. If communication and collaboration can occur 
between local and regional actors, opportunities for combined management of water 
resources at the local and regional level might present themselves. This would mean local 
management takes into consideration the framework of the watershed when 
implementing management practices. Simultaneously, decision-makers on the watershed 
council would respect local management while creating and adapting policies that 
considers the local needs as well as the regional needs for water.  
 Future investigation of watershed governance with respect to participation by 
campesino communities might consider further analysis of networking capabilities and 
potential institutionalization of these communities or other agencies to help local 
management practices scale up to the regional watershed council. In addition, once the 
Consejo de Cuenca has been implemented, researchers will have a better idea how this 
system works with regards to local participation. At this point an examination of the 
system to provide recommendations to better include local management practices will be 
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beneficial in helping the regional watershed council scale down to meet the needs of the 
local community. However, if the watershed council is successful, a model might be 
developed to provide general guidelines for other local communities and regional 
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Copper 1 3 361,203 
Antamina, Southern, 
Cerroverde 
Lead 4 4 27,568 Volcan 
Zinc 1 2 460,367 Antamina 
Gold 5 6 12.57 Yanacocha, Barrick 
Silver 2 1 531 
Volcan, Ares, Buenaventura, 
Antamina 




 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Since when have you lived in this area? 
2. Has the quality or quantity of water changed throughout the years? (How was 
your water before and what is it like now?) 
a. How 
3. What do people say about water? 
a. Are there people or groups that contaminate or improperly use water? 
4. Are there things that we can do to improve the situation? (What can we do to 
improve the situation?) 
a. Yes 
b. No…then…who can help/who can we ask for help? 
5. Who does the best job of protecting water resources and why? Who is working 
with water resources? 
6. What more can we do to help the situation or problems with water? 
a. Who 
7. How do you use water? How does the quality and quantity impact you? Are you 
working with an organization or agency with regards to water reosurces? 
8. If you had a problema with water (change in use, quality, or quantity) who would 
you talk to? 
9. Are there groups, individuals, or organizations that you have worked with befote? 
a. How did it work? 
b. What were the results? 
c. What were the dificultéis? 
d. What would you change? 
e. Would you like to work with them in the future? 
10. If you had the opportunity to work with other individuals how would you do it? 
How can individuals work together? 
11. What are groups doing currently to protect water resources? 
a. Are these projects aceptable to you? 
b. How do they affect you? 
c. What other projects would you like to see implemented? 
12. How do you take care of water resources? How do you use water responsibilly? 
a. Household 
b. Community 
13. What are the problems with water? 
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